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Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics

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ISBN-10: 1883357780

ISBN-13: 9781883357788

Edition: 2007

Authors: Thomas Aquinas, Richard Berquist, Ralph McInerny

List price: $45.00
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Book details

List price: $45.00
Copyright year: 2007
Publisher: Dumb Ox Books
Publication date: 1/10/2008
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 512
Size: 6.00" wide x 9.00" long x 1.60" tall
Weight: 1.628
Language: English

Ralph McInerny was born in Minneapolis, Minnesota on February 24, 1929. He served in the Marine Corps in the late 1940s. He received a bachelor's degree from St. Paul Seminary in 1951, a master's degree from the University of Minnesota in 1952 and a doctorate in philosophy from Laval University in Quebec in 1954. He was a member of the University of Notre Dame faculty from 1955 until 2009. He gained international renown as a scholar, author and lecturer who specialized in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. During his academic career, he was the Michael P. Grace Professor of Medieval Studies and director of the Jacques Maritain Center at the University of Notre Dame. He is founder and…    

Note on the Translation
Aquinas's Division of the Text of the Posterior Analytics
Aquinas's Commentary on the Posterior Analytics
The Need for Demonstration
Dependence of Learning on Pre-existent Knowledge
The Pre-existent Knowledge Required for Demonstration
How the Conclusion Is Foreknown
The Definition of the Why-Demonstration
Definition of the Why-Demonstration
Immediate Principles: Axioms and Suppositions
Principles Better Known than the Conclusion
Immediate Principles Not Demonstrable
Impossibility of Circular Demonstration
The Premises of the Why-Demonstration
Meaning of "Predicated of All"
The Modes of Per Se
The Commensurately Universal
Errors regarding the Commensurately Universal
Principles of Demonstration as Necessary
Principles of Demonstration as Per Se
Demonstrations Not from Extrinsic Principles
Demonstrations and Definitions as Eternal
Demonstrations Not from Common Principles
Principles and Non-principles-Common and Proper Principles
Distinctions among Common Principles
Use of Common Principles
Questions and Arguments Proper to Each Science
Deceptions Proper to Each Science-Deceptions Not Found in the Sciences
The Premises of the Fact-Demonstration
Fact-Demonstrations from Effect to Cause
Fact-Demonstrations from Remote Cause
Fact-Demonstrations in the Subalternated Sciences
The Form of the Demonstration
Superiority of the First Figure-Immediate Negative Propositions
Falsity and Ignorance in the Demonstrative Sciences
False Syllogisms Opposed to True Immediate Negative Propositions
False Syllogisms Opposed to True Immediate Affirmative Propositions
False Syllogisms Opposed to True Mediate Propositions
Sense Knowledge Required for Demonstration
The Impossibility of Demonstrations Proceeding Infinitely
Questions about Whether Demonstrations Come to an End
Questions Reduced to the Question About Affirmative Demonstrations
Presuppositions for the Logical Proof that Demonstrations Come to an End
The Logical Proof that Demonstrations Come to an End
The Analytic Proof that Demonstrations Come to an End
Corollaries of the Proofs that Demonstrations Come to an End
Comparison of Demonstrations
Arguments for the Superiority of Particular Demonstrations
Universal Demonstrations Superior to Particular Demonstrations
Affirmative Demonstrations Superior to Negative Demonstrations
Negative Demonstrations Superior to Demonstrations to the Impossible
Comparison of Sciences to Each Other and to Other Forms of Knowledge
Certitude of Sciences-Unity and Diversity of Sciences
Science in Relation to Chance Events and to Sense Knowledge
Principles Not the Same for All Sciences
Science and Opinion-Quickness of Mind
The Middle Term: Definition and Cause
The Four Questions and Their Relation to the Middle Term
Opposing Arguments on the Relation of Definition and What a Thing is to Demonstration
Definition and Demonstration Not of the Same Thing
Impossibility of Proving What a Thing Is by Convertible Terms
Impossibility of Proving What a Thing Is by Divisions
Impossibility of Proving What a Thing Is by Supposition
Impossibility of Knowing What a Thing Is by Demonstration or by Definition
How Definition and What a Thing is Are Related to Demonstration
Showing What a Thing Is by Logical Syllogism and by Demonstration
Different Kinds of Definition in Relation to Demonstration
Demonstration and the Causes
Demonstrations through the Four Causes
Demonstrations When Cause and Effect Are Simultaneous or Not Simultaneous
Continuity in Demonstrations from Non-simultaneous Causes
Demonstrations for Circular Processes and for Things Which Come to Be for the Most Part
Searching for Definitions
Predicates Signifying What a Thing Is
Seeking Definitions by the Method of Division
Replies to Objections-Rules for the Method of Division
Seeking Definitions by the Method of Similarities
Searching for Causes
Seeking the Cause of Common Characteristics
How Cause and Effect Are Not Always Convertible
How One Effect Can Have More than One Cause
The First Principles
How the First Principles Come to Be Known
Translator's Commentary