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| Preface | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Norms | |
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| Rationality in action | |
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| Norms and rationality | |
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| The plan of this work | |
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| Conventionalism and Moral Motives | |
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| The two theses of conventionalism | |
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| The scope of conventionalism | |
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| Characteristics of norms | |
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| Conventions of coordination | |
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| Intermezzo: learning by experience | |
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| More conventions: norms of property | |
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| Conventions of reciprocity | |
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| Salience | |
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| Salient payoffs | |
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| The conventional character of salience | |
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| Breaking the convention | |
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| Sanctions, stability, and social cost | |
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| Resentment | |
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| Moral force and resentment | |
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| Conclusions and prospects | |
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| Appendix to Chapter 2: the production of sanctions | |
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| Motives for Unconditional Cooperation | |
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| A first objection | |
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| Altruism | |
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| Altruistic cooperation and norm compliance | |
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| A cooperative virtue? | |
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| Process-oriented preferences for cooperation | |
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| Kantianism | |
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| The categorical imperative | |
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| Kantianism rejected | |
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| Unconditional cooperation? | |
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| Motives for Conditional Cooperation: reciprocity, trust and fairness | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Reciprocity | |
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| Reciprocity and cooperation | |
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| Trust and trustworthiness | |
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| Trust and cooperation | |
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| The secondary nature of resentment | |
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| Exploitation, parasites, and free riders | |
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| Reciprocity and nonexploitation | |
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| Reciprocity and fairness | |
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| Summary and conclusions | |
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| Virtuous Motives: restraint and spontaneity | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Aristotle on virtues | |
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| Kant on virtues | |
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| Hume on virtues | |
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| Foot on the virtues | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Evolution of the Cooperative Virtues: an indirect justification | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The theory of evolution | |
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| For the benefit of the group | |
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| For the benefit of kin | |
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| For mutual benefit | |
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| The commitment model | |
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| The role of signals in the commitment model | |
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| The reliability of signals | |
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| How convincing is evolutionary theory? | |
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| The Rationality of Plans: requirements of dynamic choice | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Plans and dynamic choice | |
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| Can SR, NEC, DC, and SEP always be satisfied? | |
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| Three responses | |
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| Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: SR | |
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| Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: NEC | |
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| Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: DC | |
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| Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: SEP | |
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| SEP and personal identity | |
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| On myopia, sophistication, and resoluteness | |
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| Changing preferences and the need for commitment | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| The Rationality of Strategic Intentions: a justification of the cooperative virtues | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The planning theory of intentions | |
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| Strategic intentions and the prisoners' dilemma | |
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| Limitations of the argument | |
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| Conclusions and further issues | |
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| References | |
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| Index | |