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Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy An Essay on the Virtues of Cooperation

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ISBN-10: 140200639X

ISBN-13: 9781402006395

Edition: 2002

Authors: Bruno Verbeek

List price: $179.99
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Description:

This book deals with a fundamental problem in political and moral philosophy: why should an otherwise rational agent comply with norms? The book is unique in that it deals with this question against the background of previously unconnected work in areas as diverse as evolutionary game theory, moral philosophy, action theory, formal decision theory, and social psychology. The author argues that standard rational choice analyses fail to explain several crucial features of norm-guided behavior. A complete analysis of the reasons rational agents have for compliance with norms has to include an account of specific virtues, such as trust and fairness. In order to accommodate these virtues in the…    
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Book details

List price: $179.99
Copyright year: 2002
Publisher: Springer
Publication date: 6/30/2002
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 292
Size: 6.50" wide x 9.50" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 1.342
Language: English

Preface
Introduction
Norms
Rationality in action
Norms and rationality
The plan of this work
Conventionalism and Moral Motives
The two theses of conventionalism
The scope of conventionalism
Characteristics of norms
Conventions of coordination
Intermezzo: learning by experience
More conventions: norms of property
Conventions of reciprocity
Salience
Salient payoffs
The conventional character of salience
Breaking the convention
Sanctions, stability, and social cost
Resentment
Moral force and resentment
Conclusions and prospects
Appendix to Chapter 2: the production of sanctions
Motives for Unconditional Cooperation
A first objection
Altruism
Altruistic cooperation and norm compliance
A cooperative virtue?
Process-oriented preferences for cooperation
Kantianism
The categorical imperative
Kantianism rejected
Unconditional cooperation?
Motives for Conditional Cooperation: reciprocity, trust and fairness
Introduction
Reciprocity
Reciprocity and cooperation
Trust and trustworthiness
Trust and cooperation
The secondary nature of resentment
Exploitation, parasites, and free riders
Reciprocity and nonexploitation
Reciprocity and fairness
Summary and conclusions
Virtuous Motives: restraint and spontaneity
Introduction
Aristotle on virtues
Kant on virtues
Hume on virtues
Foot on the virtues
Conclusion
Evolution of the Cooperative Virtues: an indirect justification
Introduction
The theory of evolution
For the benefit of the group
For the benefit of kin
For mutual benefit
The commitment model
The role of signals in the commitment model
The reliability of signals
How convincing is evolutionary theory?
The Rationality of Plans: requirements of dynamic choice
Introduction
Plans and dynamic choice
Can SR, NEC, DC, and SEP always be satisfied?
Three responses
Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: SR
Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: NEC
Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: DC
Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: SEP
SEP and personal identity
On myopia, sophistication, and resoluteness
Changing preferences and the need for commitment
Conclusion
The Rationality of Strategic Intentions: a justification of the cooperative virtues
Introduction
The planning theory of intentions
Strategic intentions and the prisoners' dilemma
Limitations of the argument
Conclusions and further issues
References
Index