Behavioral Theory of Elections

Name: Behavioral Theory of Elections
Price: 34.97 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780691135076

ISBN-10: 069113507X

ISBN-13: 9780691135076

Edition: 2011

Authors: Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, David A. Siegel, Michael M. Ting

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Description:

Most theories of elections assume that voters and political actors are fully rational. While these formulations produce many insights, they also generate anomalies--most famously, about turnout. The rise of behavioral economics has posed new challenges to the premise of rationality. This groundbreaking book provides a behavioral theory of elections based on the notion that all actors--politicians as well as voters--are only boundedly rational. The theory posits learning via trial-and-error: actions that surpass an actor's aspiration level are more likely to be used in the future, while those that fall short are less likely to be tried later on.Based on this idea of adaptation, the authors…

Book details

List price: $35.00
Copyright year: 2011
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Publication date: 3/1/2011
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 264
Size: 6.10" wide x 9.29" long x 0.65" tall
Weight: 0.858
Language: English



Acknowledgments



Bounded Rationality and Elections



Framing and Representations



Heuristics



Aspiration-based Adaptation and Bounded Rationality



Plan of This Book



Aspiration-based Adaptive Rules



ABARs Defined



Some Important Properties of ABARs



The Evidential Status of Aspiration-based Adaptation



Party Competition



Related Work



The Model and Its Implications



Informed and/or Sophisticated Challengers



Robustness Issues



Conclusions



Turnout



The Model



Main Results



Variations in Participation



Conclusions



Voter Choice



The Model



The Endogenous Emergence of Party Affiliation



Misperceptions



Retrospection and Prospection Combined



Voter Sophistication and Electoral Outcomes



Institutions and Unsophisticated Retrospective Voters



Conclusions



An Integrated Model of Two-Party Elections



Full Computational Model for Two Parties



Some Results of the Basic Integrated Model



The Choices of Voters



Party Location



Turnout



New Questions



Conclusion



Elections with Multiple Parties



Extending Our Results to Multiple Parties



Multicandidate Competition and Duverger's Law



The Model and Simulation Results



An Intuition



ABARs and Dynamic Stability



Model Meets Data



Conclusions: Bounded Rationality and Elections



Testing the Theory



Normative Considerations: Voter Error and Systemic Performance



Extensions



Proofs



The Computational Model



Overview



Graphical Model



Batch Model


Bibliography


Index