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Behavioral Theory of Elections

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ISBN-10: 069113507X

ISBN-13: 9780691135076

Edition: 2011

Authors: Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, David A. Siegel, Michael M. Ting

List price: $35.00
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Most theories of elections assume that voters and political actors are fully rational. While these formulations produce many insights, they also generate anomalies--most famously, about turnout. The rise of behavioral economics has posed new challenges to the premise of rationality. This groundbreaking book provides a behavioral theory of elections based on the notion that all actors--politicians as well as voters--are only boundedly rational. The theory posits learning via trial-and-error: actions that surpass an actor's aspiration level are more likely to be used in the future, while those that fall short are less likely to be tried later on.Based on this idea of adaptation, the authors…    
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Book details

List price: $35.00
Copyright year: 2011
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Publication date: 3/1/2011
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 264
Size: 6.10" wide x 9.29" long x 0.65" tall
Weight: 0.858
Language: English

Bounded Rationality and Elections
Framing and Representations
Aspiration-based Adaptation and Bounded Rationality
Plan of This Book
Aspiration-based Adaptive Rules
ABARs Defined
Some Important Properties of ABARs
The Evidential Status of Aspiration-based Adaptation
Party Competition
Related Work
The Model and Its Implications
Informed and/or Sophisticated Challengers
Robustness Issues
The Model
Main Results
Variations in Participation
Voter Choice
The Model
The Endogenous Emergence of Party Affiliation
Retrospection and Prospection Combined
Voter Sophistication and Electoral Outcomes
Institutions and Unsophisticated Retrospective Voters
An Integrated Model of Two-Party Elections
Full Computational Model for Two Parties
Some Results of the Basic Integrated Model
The Choices of Voters
Party Location
New Questions
Elections with Multiple Parties
Extending Our Results to Multiple Parties
Multicandidate Competition and Duverger's Law
The Model and Simulation Results
An Intuition
ABARs and Dynamic Stability
Model Meets Data
Conclusions: Bounded Rationality and Elections
Testing the Theory
Normative Considerations: Voter Error and Systemic Performance
The Computational Model
Graphical Model
Batch Model