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Strong Medicine Creating Incentives for Pharmaceutical Research on Neglected Diseases

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ISBN-10: 0691121133

ISBN-13: 9780691121130

Edition: 2005

Authors: Michael Kremer, Rachel Glennerster

List price: $53.00
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Description:

Millions of people in the third world die from diseases that are rare in the first world--diseases like malaria, tuberculosis, and schistosomiasis. AIDS, which is now usually treated in rich countries, still ravages the world's poor. Vaccines offer the best hope for controlling these diseases and could dramatically improve health in poor countries. But developers have little incentive to undertake the costly and risky research needed to develop vaccines. This is partly because the potential consumers are poor, but also because governments drive down prices. InStrong Medicine, Michael Kremer and Rachel Glennerster offer an innovative yet simple solution to this worldwide problem: "Pull"…    
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Book details

List price: $53.00
Copyright year: 2005
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Publication date: 9/27/2004
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 152
Size: 6.57" wide x 9.49" long x 0.68" tall
Weight: 0.814
Language: English

Foreword
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Health in Low-Income Countries
The Disease Environment in Low-Income Countries
Weak Health-Care Infrastructure
Malaria, Tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS
The Impact of Cheap, Simple Technologies
The Paucity of Private R&D Targeted to the Needs of Low-Income Countries
The Extent of R&D Targeted to Low-Income Countries
The Scientific Potential for New Vaccines
Market and Government Failures
Why Target Foreign Assistance to Vaccine R&D?
The Patent Tradeoff
Low-Income Countries and Intellectual Property
Social versus Private Return: Some Quantitative Estimates
The Role of Public Purchases
The Role of Push PRograms
Meningococcal Meningitis: An Example of a Successful Push Program
A Cautionary Tale: The USAID Malaria Vaccine Program
Incentives under Push Programs
The Potential Role of Pull Programs
The Effect of Market Size on Innovation
The Impact of Financial Incentive Programs
Examples of Pull Programs Stimulating Research
Advantages and Limitations of Pull Programs
Pull Programs: A Menu
Commitments to Finance Purchase of Products and Patents
Patent Extensions on Other Pharmaceuticals as Compensation for Vaccine Development
Best-Entry Tournaments
Expanding the Market for Existing Vaccines and Drugs
Determining Eligibility
Basic Technical Requirements
Independent Adjudication Committee
Market-Test Requirement
Exit Clauses
How Much Should We Promise to Pay for a Vaccine?
What Market Size Is Needed to Spur Research?
Cost-Effectiveness: What Is a Vaccine Worth?
How Should Payment be Structured?
Paying for Multiple Vaccines and Market Exclusivity
Bonus Payments Based on Product Quality
Increasing the Promised Price over Time
Avoiding Windfalls
Industry Consultations
Scope of the Commitment
What Diseases to Cover?
Vaccines, Drugs, and Other Technologies
Incentives for Agricultural R&D
Moving Forward With Vaccine Commitments
Making a Commitment Legally Binding
The Politics of Creating Markets for Vaccines and Drugs
Potential Sponsors of New Markets for Vaccines and Drugs
References
Index