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Foreword | |
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Acknowledgments | |
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Introduction | |
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Health in Low-Income Countries | |
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The Disease Environment in Low-Income Countries | |
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Weak Health-Care Infrastructure | |
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Malaria, Tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS | |
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The Impact of Cheap, Simple Technologies | |
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The Paucity of Private R&D Targeted to the Needs of Low-Income Countries | |
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The Extent of R&D Targeted to Low-Income Countries | |
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The Scientific Potential for New Vaccines | |
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Market and Government Failures | |
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Why Target Foreign Assistance to Vaccine R&D? | |
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The Patent Tradeoff | |
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Low-Income Countries and Intellectual Property | |
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Social versus Private Return: Some Quantitative Estimates | |
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The Role of Public Purchases | |
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The Role of Push PRograms | |
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Meningococcal Meningitis: An Example of a Successful Push Program | |
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A Cautionary Tale: The USAID Malaria Vaccine Program | |
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Incentives under Push Programs | |
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The Potential Role of Pull Programs | |
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The Effect of Market Size on Innovation | |
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The Impact of Financial Incentive Programs | |
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Examples of Pull Programs Stimulating Research | |
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Advantages and Limitations of Pull Programs | |
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Pull Programs: A Menu | |
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Commitments to Finance Purchase of Products and Patents | |
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Patent Extensions on Other Pharmaceuticals as Compensation for Vaccine Development | |
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Best-Entry Tournaments | |
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Expanding the Market for Existing Vaccines and Drugs | |
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Determining Eligibility | |
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Basic Technical Requirements | |
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Independent Adjudication Committee | |
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Market-Test Requirement | |
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Exit Clauses | |
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How Much Should We Promise to Pay for a Vaccine? | |
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What Market Size Is Needed to Spur Research? | |
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Cost-Effectiveness: What Is a Vaccine Worth? | |
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How Should Payment be Structured? | |
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Paying for Multiple Vaccines and Market Exclusivity | |
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Bonus Payments Based on Product Quality | |
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Increasing the Promised Price over Time | |
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Avoiding Windfalls | |
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Industry Consultations | |
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Scope of the Commitment | |
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What Diseases to Cover? | |
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Vaccines, Drugs, and Other Technologies | |
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Incentives for Agricultural R&D | |
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Moving Forward With Vaccine Commitments | |
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Making a Commitment Legally Binding | |
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The Politics of Creating Markets for Vaccines and Drugs | |
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Potential Sponsors of New Markets for Vaccines and Drugs | |
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References | |
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Index | |