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| Preface | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Introduction to the Theory | |
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| A Survey of Auction Theory | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Plan of this chapter | |
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| The standard auction types | |
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| The basic models of auctions | |
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| Bidding in the standard auctions | |
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| Terminology | |
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| Early Literature | |
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| Introduction to the Recent Literature | |
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| The Basic Analysis of Optimal Auctions, Revenue Equivalence, and Marginal Revenues | |
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| Risk-Aversion | |
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| Correlation and Affiliation | |
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| Asymmetries | |
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| Private value differences | |
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| Almost-common-values | |
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| Information advantages | |
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| Entry Costs and the Number of Bidders | |
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| Endogenous entry of bidders | |
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| The value of additional bidders | |
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| Information aggregation with large numbers of bidders | |
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| Unknown number of bidders | |
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| Collusion | |
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| Multi-Unit Auctions | |
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| Optimal auctions | |
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| Simultaneous auctions | |
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| Sequential auctions | |
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| Efficient auctions | |
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| Royalties, Incentives Contracts, and Payments for Quality | |
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| Double Auctions, etc. | |
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| Double auctions | |
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| Related two-sided trading mechanisms | |
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| Other Topics | |
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| Budget constraints | |
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| Externalities between bidders | |
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| Jump bidding | |
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| The war of attrition | |
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| Competing auctioneers | |
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| Testing the Theory | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Appendix | |
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| The Revenue Equivalence Theorem | |
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| Marginal Revenues | |
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| Affiliated Signals | |
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| Examples Using the Uniform Distribution | |
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| Bibliography | |
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| Afterword | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Applications to Other Areas of Economics | |
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| Why Every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Using Auction-Theoretic Tools in Economics: The Revenue Equivalence Theorem | |
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| Comparing litigation systems | |
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| The war of attrition | |
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| Queuing and other "all-pay" applications | |
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| Solving for equilibrium behavior: market crashes and trading "frenzies" | |
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| Translating Looser Analogies From Auctions into Economics: Ascending vs. (First-Price) Sealed-Bid Auctions | |
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| Internet sales vs. dealer sales | |
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| Anglo-Dutch auctions, a theory of rationing, and patent races | |
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| Exploiting Deeper Connections between Auctions and Economics: Marginal Revenues | |
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| Applying Auction Theory to Price-Setting Oligopolies | |
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| Marginal-cost pricing is NOT the unique Bertrand equilibrium | |
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| The value of new consumers | |
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| Information aggregation in perfect competition | |
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| Applying Auction Theory (and Economics) to Auction Markets | |
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| Important auction markets | |
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| Applying economics to auction design | |
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| 2.7 Conclusion | |
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| Appendix | |
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| Comparing Litigation Systems | |
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| Direct Proof of Monopoly-Theoretic Version of Proposition in Section 2.4 | |
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| Practical Auction Design | |
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| What Really Matters in Auction Design | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Collusion | |
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| Entry Deterrence and Predation | |
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| Other Pitfalls | |
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| Reserve prices | |
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| Political problems | |
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| Loopholes | |
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| Credibility of the rules | |
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| Market structure | |
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| When is auction design less important? | |
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| Solutions | |
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| Making the ascending auction more robust | |
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| Using sealed-bid auctions | |
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| The Anglo-Dutch auction | |
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| Antitrust | |
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| Tailoring Auction Design To The Context | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Using and Abusing Auction Theory | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Received Auction Theory | |
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| Relevance of the received theory | |
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| The Elementary Economic Theory that Matters | |
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| Entry | |
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| Collusion | |
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| Robustness to Political Pressures | |
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| Economic similarity- | |