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Auctions Theory and Practice

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ISBN-10: 0691119252

ISBN-13: 9780691119250

Edition: 2004

Authors: Paul Klemperer

List price: $58.00
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Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practiceprovides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes…    
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Book details

List price: $58.00
Copyright year: 2004
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Publication date: 3/28/2004
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 264
Size: 6.54" wide x 9.37" long x 0.68" tall
Weight: 0.792
Language: English

Introduction to the Theory
A Survey of Auction Theory
Plan of this chapter
The standard auction types
The basic models of auctions
Bidding in the standard auctions
Early Literature
Introduction to the Recent Literature
The Basic Analysis of Optimal Auctions, Revenue Equivalence, and Marginal Revenues
Correlation and Affiliation
Private value differences
Information advantages
Entry Costs and the Number of Bidders
Endogenous entry of bidders
The value of additional bidders
Information aggregation with large numbers of bidders
Unknown number of bidders
Multi-Unit Auctions
Optimal auctions
Simultaneous auctions
Sequential auctions
Efficient auctions
Royalties, Incentives Contracts, and Payments for Quality
Double Auctions, etc.
Double auctions
Related two-sided trading mechanisms
Other Topics
Budget constraints
Externalities between bidders
Jump bidding
The war of attrition
Competing auctioneers
Testing the Theory
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem
Marginal Revenues
Affiliated Signals
Examples Using the Uniform Distribution
Applications to Other Areas of Economics
Why Every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory
Using Auction-Theoretic Tools in Economics: The Revenue Equivalence Theorem
Comparing litigation systems
The war of attrition
Queuing and other "all-pay" applications
Solving for equilibrium behavior: market crashes and trading "frenzies"
Translating Looser Analogies From Auctions into Economics: Ascending vs. (First-Price) Sealed-Bid Auctions
Internet sales vs. dealer sales
Anglo-Dutch auctions, a theory of rationing, and patent races
Exploiting Deeper Connections between Auctions and Economics: Marginal Revenues
Applying Auction Theory to Price-Setting Oligopolies
Marginal-cost pricing is NOT the unique Bertrand equilibrium
The value of new consumers
Information aggregation in perfect competition
Applying Auction Theory (and Economics) to Auction Markets
Important auction markets
Applying economics to auction design
2.7 Conclusion
Comparing Litigation Systems
Direct Proof of Monopoly-Theoretic Version of Proposition in Section 2.4
Practical Auction Design
What Really Matters in Auction Design
Entry Deterrence and Predation
Other Pitfalls
Reserve prices
Political problems
Credibility of the rules
Market structure
When is auction design less important?
Making the ascending auction more robust
Using sealed-bid auctions
The Anglo-Dutch auction
Tailoring Auction Design To The Context
Using and Abusing Auction Theory
The Received Auction Theory
Relevance of the received theory
The Elementary Economic Theory that Matters
Robustness to Political Pressures
Economic similarity-