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| The Rule of Law | |
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| Impeachment and the Rule of Law | |
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| Arbitrary Government and the Principles of Legality | |
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| Government Under Law | |
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| Government by Rules | |
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| Fair Warning and the Formal Features of Legal Rules | |
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| Due Process | |
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| The Power of the People | |
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| Corruption | |
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| Vengeance | |
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| Liberty and Prosperity | |
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| Ancient Liberty | |
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| Liberty and Prosperity in the Modern Era | |
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| Hobbes and Austin: The Sovereign as Above the Law | |
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| The King versus Parliament | |
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| Philosophical Confusions | |
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| A Round Square? | |
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| Austin's Contribution | |
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| Human Nature | |
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| The Crooked Timber of Humanity | |
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| Republican Government | |
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| Hobbes versus Kant and Madison | |
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| Substantive versus Legal Justice | |
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| The Impeachment Controversy: Background | |
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| Power, Privacy, and Prosecution | |
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| The Real-World Rule of Law | |
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| Political Trials | |
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| The Impeachment Trial | |
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| Should the Rule of Law Apply? | |
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| The Trial of the President | |
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| The Role of Politics | |
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| The Vagueness Problem | |
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| Law and Morality | |
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| A Common Saying | |
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| Judgment at Nuremberg | |
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| Historical Background | |
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| Criticisms of the Trial | |
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| Justifying the Trial | |
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| Assessing the Trial | |
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| Natural Law Theory: Overview | |
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| Traditional Natural Law Theory: Background | |
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| Aquinas's Theory of Law | |
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| Law and the Good | |
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| Assessing Aquinas | |
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| Fuller and Fidelity to Law | |
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| The Inner Morality of Law | |
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| Assessing Fuller's Inner Morality | |
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| Law and Social Purpose | |
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| Dworkin's Interpretive Theory | |
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| Rules and Principles: The Idea of Fit | |
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| Fitting the Fourth Amendment: Privacy | |
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| Olmstead and Beyond | |
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| The Role of Morality | |
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| The Challenge of Skepticism | |
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| Assessing Dworkin | |
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| Legal Positivism: Overview | |
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| Austin's Theory of Law | |
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| Law as Command | |
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| Assessing Austin | |
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| Hart: Law as Primary and Secondary Rules | |
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| Types of Legal Rules | |
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| Legal Obligation: Government and Gunman | |
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| Primary and Secondary Rules | |
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| Assessing Hart | |
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| Summary: Natural Law versus Positivism | |
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| The Constitution | |
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| Popular Government and the Rule of Law | |
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| The Undisciplined Public | |
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| The Constitutional Design | |
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| The "Troublesome" Provisions | |
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| The Supreme Court and Judicial Review | |
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| Jefferson's View | |
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| Judicial Review as Antidemocratic | |
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| The Historical Record | |
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| Judicial Self-Restraint | |
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| Judicial Review and the Rule of Law | |
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| The Judiciary as Policeman | |
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| The Judiciary as Expert Interpreter | |
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| Judicial Review and Democracy | |
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| Ely's Argument: Perfecting Democracy | |
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| Criticisms of Ely: The Political Process | |
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| Ackerman's Argument: The Sovereign People | |
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| Criticisms of Ackerman: The Rule of Law | |
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| Constitutional Interpretation: Implicit Rights? | |
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| The Right to Privacy: Griswold v. Connecticut | |
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| Criticisms of Griswold | |
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| Framers' Intent | |
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| Original Understanding | |
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| Bork's Theory | |
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| Criticisms of Bork: Naked Power Organs | |
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| Dworkin and the Constitution | |
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| Criticisms of Dworkin | |
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| Bork versus Dworkin | |
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| Whose Morality? | |
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| Judgment and Action | |
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| The Supreme Court versus Society | |
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| Private Law: Torts, Contracts, and Property | |
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| The Functions of Private Law | |
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| The Traditional Public-Private Distinction | |
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| Criticisms of the Public-Private Distinction | |
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| Legal Realism and the Politics of Private Law | |
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| Property and Progress: The Labor Injunction | |
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| Assessing the Realist Challenge | |
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| The Traditional Contract-Tort Distinction | |
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| Criticisms of the Contract-Tort Distinction | |
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| Defenses of the Contract-Tort Distinction | |
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| Assessing Traditionalism | |
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| Subjective and Objective Approaches in Tort Law | |
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| A Case of Self-Defense | |
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| The Actual Person or the Reasonable Person? | |
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| Subcategorizing | |
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| The Duty to Aid | |
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| The Common-Law Approach | |
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| The Ames Rule | |
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| Feinberg and the Right to Assistance | |
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| Epstein and Bright Lines | |
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| Criminal Law | |
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| Torts and Crimes | |
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| A Utilitarian Approach | |
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| Bentham's Principle of Utility | |
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| The Utilitarian Aims of Punishment | |
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| Criticisms of the Utilitarian Approach | |
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| A Retributivist Approach | |
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| Justice and Desert | |
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| Why Punishment Is Deserved | |
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| Criticisms of Retributivism | |
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| The Therapeutic Model | |
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| Rehabilitation, Not Punishment | |
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| Criticisms of the Therapeutic Model | |
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| Amount of Punishment | |
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| A Utilitarian Approach | |
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| Criticisms of the Utilitarian Approach | |
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| A Retributivist Approach | |
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| Criticisms of Retributivism | |
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| Davis's Version of Retributivism | |
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| Criticisms of Davis | |
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| Mens Rea versus Strict Liability | |
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| The Guilty Mind | |
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| Objective and Strict Liability | |
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| Strict Liability: Against | |
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| Strict Liability: For | |
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| Limits of Criminal Law | |
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| The Public-Private Distinction | |
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| J. S. Mill and the Harm Principle | |
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| The Devlin-Hart Debate | |
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| Law and Economics | |
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| The Economic Analysis of Law | |
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| Economic Rationality | |
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| Rational Action | |
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| An Example: The Rational Athlete | |
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| Rationality and Uncertainty | |
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| Economic Efficiency | |
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| Utilitarianism and Beyond | |
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| Pareto's Concepts of Efficiency | |
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| The Limitations of Pareto's Efficiency Concepts | |
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| Kaldor, Hicks, and Posner | |
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| Scarcity and Efficiency | |
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| The Efficiency of the Common Law | |
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| Contract Law | |
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| Negligence and the Hand Formula | |
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| Property | |
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| The Coase Theorem | |
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| An Efficiency Explanation of Common Law | |
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| Posner's Argument | |
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| Criticisms of Posner | |
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| Social Morality versus Efficiency | |
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| The Scientific Status of Law and Economics | |
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| Scientific Method | |
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| Is Law and Economics Scientific? | |
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| The Evaluation of Law: Should Law Maximize Wealth? | |
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| The Biggest Pie? | |
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| Other Virtues of Wealth Maximization? | |
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| Wealth Maximization and the Poor | |
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| Political Disagreement in Law and Economics | |
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| What Kind of Market? | |
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| Conservatives versus Liberals | |
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| Is Efficiency a Neutral Value? | |
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| The Value of Efficiency | |
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| Dworkin's Critique of Efficiency | |
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| Taking Efficiency Seriously | |
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| Feminism and the Law | |
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| Feminism versus the Traditional View of Women | |
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| Woman's Place | |
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| The Feminist Rebellion | |
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| Types of Feminism | |
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| Two Central Issues | |
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| Liberals, Radicals, Progressives, and Conservatives | |
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| The Question of Patriarchy | |
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| Discrimination and Oppression | |
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| Is Patriarchy a Thing of the Past? | |
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| The Question of Privacy: A Radical View | |
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| The Problems with Privacy | |
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| Fighting "Private" Oppression | |
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| Women's Labor | |
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| Abortion Rights: Beyond Privacy to Equality | |
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| Abortion and the Indigent | |
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| Equality: Eradicating Women's Oppression | |
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| Abortion Rights: A Liberal View | |
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| Defending the Right of Privacy | |
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| Liberal Equality | |
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| Abortion Rights: The Liberal or Radical Approach? | |
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| The Legal Argument | |
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| The Moral Argument | |
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| The Difference Debate | |
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| Pregnancy Benefits | |
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| Special Treatment or Equal Treatment? | |
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| Women's Values? | |
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| Pornography: Free Speech and Women's Rights | |
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| A Linchpin of Patriarchy | |
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| Protecting Pornography | |
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| Silencing Women | |
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| The Harm of Pornography | |
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| Pornography on Trial: American Booksellers v. Hudnut | |
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| The Ordinance | |
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| The Ruling: Easterbrook's Opinion | |
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| MacKinnon's Criticisms | |
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| The Psychology of Pornography | |
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| Evidence of Harm? | |
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| Patriarchy Revisited: The Role of Reason | |
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| Beyond Statistics | |
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| Is Reason "Male"? | |
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| Race and American Law | |
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| Race, Citizenship, and Identity | |
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| Jim Crow and the One-Drop Rule | |
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| Separate but Equal: The Plessy Case | |
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| A Reasonable Dissent from Plessy: Law and Scientific Racism | |
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| Beyond Separate but Equal: The Brown Case | |
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| The Small Steps to Brown | |
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| Brown: Constitutional Equality | |
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| The Civil Rights Revolution | |
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| Beyond Litigation | |
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| Social Agitation: Martin Luther King, Jr. versus George Wallace | |
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| The Civil Rights Act of 1964 | |
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| The Voting Rights Act: Race and Democracy | |
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| The Black Power Movement | |
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| The Idea of Institutional Racism | |
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| Racial Discrimination: Intent versus Disparate Impact | |
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| Critical Race Theory | |
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| Overview | |
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| Racism and the Rule of Law | |
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| Affirmative Action | |
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| The Law and Politics of Affirmative Action | |
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| Individual Rights | |
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| Social Effects: Academic Values and Racial Identities | |
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| Critical Legal Studies | |
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| The Crits: An Introduction | |
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| Law, Power, and Hierarchy | |
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| Against the Rule of Law: Politics, Morality, and Law | |
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| Crits, Feminists, and Critical Race Theorists | |
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| Crits and Conservatives | |
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| Legal Reasoning: A Mainstream Account | |
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| Law and Authority | |
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| Law and Reason | |
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| Reasoning: Legal and Practical | |
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| The Doctrine of Precedent: Stare Decisis | |
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| Legal Reasoning: The Attack Begins | |
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| Realism and Formalism | |
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| Indeterminacy | |
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| So Long, Stare Decisis | |
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| An Example: Hardwick's Right to Privacy? | |
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| Clusters of Rules | |
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| Justification and Motivation | |
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| Reluctant Realists | |
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| Domesticating Realism | |
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| Legal Reasoning: The Crits Attack | |
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| Law as a Patchwork | |
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| The Contradictions of Private Law | |
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| Law, Liberty, and Liberalism | |
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| Liberalism and the Rule of Law | |
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| Unger and the Contradictions of Liberalism | |
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| The Mainstream versus the Crits | |
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| Critics of the Crits | |
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| Dworkin and Legal Reasoning | |
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| The Crits' Response | |
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| Competition and Contradiction: Dworkin Replies | |
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| The Crits' Last Stand | |