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Algorithmic Game Theory

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ISBN-10: 0521872820

ISBN-13: 9780521872829

Edition: 2007

Authors: Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, Vijay V. Vazirani

List price: $66.99
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With contributions from major researchers in the field, 'Algorithmic Game Theory' presents a comprehensive treatment of this important practical application.
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Book details

List price: $66.99
Copyright year: 2007
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 9/24/2007
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 778
Size: 7.25" wide x 10.00" long x 2.00" tall
Weight: 3.608
Language: English

Tim Roughgarden is Assistant Professor of Computer Science at Stanford University and recipient of the ACM's Grace Hopper Award.

Introduction
Computing in Games
Basic solution concepts and computational issues
Algorithms for equilibria
Equilibrium computation for games in strategic and extensive form
Learning, regret minimization and correlated equilibria
Graphical games
Cryptography and game theory
Combinatorial algorithms for market equilibria Vijay V. Vazirani
Computation of market equilibria by convex programming
Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists)
Mechanism design without money
Combinatorial auctions
Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms
Profit maximization in mechanism design
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design
Cost sharing
On-line mechanisms
Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria
Introduction to the inefficiency of equillibria
Routing games
Inefficiency of equilibria in network formation games
Selfish load-balancing
Efficiency loss and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms
Additional Topics
Incentives and pricing in communication networks
Incentives in peer-to-peer systems
Cascading behavior in networks: algorithmic and economic issues
Incentives and information security
Computational aspects of information markets
Manipulation-resistant reputation systems
Sponsored search auctions
Algorithmic issues in evolutionary game theory