Algorithmic Game Theory
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Description: With contributions from major researchers in the field, 'Algorithmic Game Theory' presents a comprehensive treatment of this important practical application.
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All the information you need in one place! Each Study Brief is a summary of one specific subject; facts, figures, and explanations to help you learn faster.
List price: $67.00
Copyright year: 2007
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 9/24/2007
Size: 7.25" wide x 10.00" long x 2.00" tall
Tim Roughgarden is Assistant Professor of Computer Science at Stanford University and recipient of the ACM's Grace Hopper Award.
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