Algorithmic Game Theory

Name: Algorithmic Game Theory
Price: 66.66 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780521872829

ISBN-10: 0521872820

ISBN-13: 9780521872829

Edition: 2007

Authors: Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, Vijay V. Vazirani

List price: $73.99

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With contributions from major researchers in the field, 'Algorithmic Game Theory' presents a comprehensive treatment of this important practical application.

Book details

List price: $73.99
Copyright year: 2007
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 9/24/2007
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 778
Size: 7.28" wide x 10.20" long x 1.81" tall
Weight: 3.608
Language: English

Tim Roughgarden is Assistant Professor of Computer Science at Stanford University and recipient of the ACM's Grace Hopper Award.



Introduction




Computing in Games



Basic solution concepts and computational issues




Algorithms for equilibria




Equilibrium computation for games in strategic and extensive form




Learning, regret minimization and correlated equilibria




Graphical games




Cryptography and game theory




Combinatorial algorithms for market equilibria Vijay V. Vazirani



Computation of market equilibria by convex programming




Algorithmic Mechanism Design



Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists)




Mechanism design without money




Combinatorial auctions




Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms




Profit maximization in mechanism design




Distributed algorithmic mechanism design




Cost sharing




On-line mechanisms




Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria



Introduction to the inefficiency of equillibria




Routing games




Inefficiency of equilibria in network formation games




Selfish load-balancing




Efficiency loss and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms




Additional Topics



Incentives and pricing in communication networks




Incentives in peer-to-peer systems




Cascading behavior in networks: algorithmic and economic issues




Incentives and information security




Computational aspects of information markets




Manipulation-resistant reputation systems




Sponsored search auctions




Algorithmic issues in evolutionary game theory