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List of Figures | |
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List of Tables | |
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Preface | |
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The Interaction of Policy and Outcomes | |
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Coordinating Price Information | |
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Features of the Book | |
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Related Work | |
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The Plan of the Book | |
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Outcomes and Policy: An Illustration | |
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Inflation-Output Costabilization: The Data | |
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Inflation Volatility | |
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Output Volatility | |
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Data on Inflation Uncertainty | |
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Inflation-Stabilization Policy and IOCS | |
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Policymakers and Information Coordination | |
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Policy Indicators | |
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The Federal Funds Rate Ratio | |
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The Taylor Rule | |
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Taylor Principle Deviations | |
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The Interest Rate Volatility and IOCS Trade-Off | |
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Summary | |
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Policy Evolution: 1960 to 2000 | |
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The 1960s: Deemphasizing Inflation Stability | |
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The 1970s: Inflation Instability and Stagflation | |
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The 1980s: Inflation Stability Reemphasized | |
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The 1990s: Continuity and Preemption | |
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Summary | |
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The Role of Policymakers | |
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The Theoretical Model | |
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Price Level Adjustment | |
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Aggregate Demand | |
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The Policy Rule | |
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Implementation | |
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The Taylor Rule: Structure and Development | |
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Summary | |
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Policy and Aggregate Variability | |
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Feasibility | |
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Equilibrium Inflation and Alternative Target Mixes | |
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Equilibrium Output and Alternative Target Mixes | |
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Aggregate Variability | |
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The Policy Rule and Inflation Variability | |
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The Crossover Effect of Output Targeting (CEOT) | |
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The Policy Rule and Output Variability | |
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The Crossover Effect of Inflation Targeting (CEIT) | |
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Summary | |
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Appendix to Chapter 5 | |
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Solving the System | |
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The Optimal Policymaker Role | |
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Optimal Policy Target Emphasis | |
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Regime and Preference Shifts and IOCS | |
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Feasible Policy Weight Ranges | |
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IOCS in the Presence of Exogenous Shocks | |
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Summary | |
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Appendix to Chapter 6 | |
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The Interest Rate Volatility and IOCS Trade-Off: A Test | |
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Coordination Dynamics | |
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Coordinating Inflation Forecasts | |
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Empirical Implications of the Theoretical Model | |
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The Relative-Real-Wage Contract Specification | |
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The IS Specification | |
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The Taylor Rule | |
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Stability Analysis | |
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The Equilibrium Inflation Rate | |
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Expectational Stability | |
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Policy and Inflation Dynamics | |
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Inflation Persistence | |
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Inflation Volatility | |
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Tests | |
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Estimates of Inflation Persistence | |
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The Appropriate Structural Break and Policy Effectiveness | |
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Estimates of Inflation Persistence and Volatility | |
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Summary | |
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Appendix to Chapter 7 | |
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A Brief Summary of the Adaptive Learning Approach | |
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Inflation-Stabilizing Policy: Robustness | |
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The Model | |
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Determinacy | |
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Adaptive Learning by Agents | |
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Model Illustrations | |
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Learning Dynamics | |
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Inflation Persistence | |
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Summary | |
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Conclusion and Implications | |
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Implications for Policymakers | |
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Institutional Reform and Information Coordination | |
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Implications for Future Research | |
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The Need for Comparative Analysis | |
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The Effect of Political and Social Forces on Policy | |
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Long-Term Consequences | |
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Final Thoughts | |
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References | |
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Index | |