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List of Figures | |
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Acknowledgments | |
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Revolutions in Science and Science Studies | |
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The Place of Kuhn's Work in Studies of Science | |
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Revolutions in Science | |
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Theories of Concepts | |
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The Classical Theory of Concepts | |
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The Roschian Revolution | |
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Three Responses to the Roschian Revolution | |
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Nature and Scope of the Present Work | |
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Kuhn's Theory of Concepts | |
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Exemplars | |
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The Learning Procedure | |
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Similarity, Dissimilarity, and Kind Hierarchies | |
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Knowledge of Ontology and Knowledge of Regularities | |
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Individual Differences and Graded Structures | |
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Generalization to Scientific Concepts | |
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Nomic and Normic Concepts | |
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A Scientific Conceptual Structure: Early Nuclear Physics | |
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Representing Concepts by Means of Dynamic Frames | |
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Constituents of Dynamic Frames | |
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Frames in Human Cognition | |
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Evidence for Attribute-Value Sets | |
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Evidence for Intraconceptual Relations | |
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Family Resemblance and Graded Structure in Frames | |
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Frames and Kind Hierarchies | |
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Knowledge of Regularities and Ontological Knowledge | |
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Value Constraints and Causal Theories | |
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Scientific Change | |
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The Phase Model of Scientific Development | |
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Hierarchical Principles of Stable Conceptual Structures | |
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The No-Overlap Principle | |
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The Exhaustion Principle | |
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The Inclusion Principle | |
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Anomalies as Violations of the Hierarchical Principles | |
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Sundevall's Taxonomy: Conceptual Revision in Normal Science | |
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Core Concepts of Nuclear Physics in the 1930s | |
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Anomalies in Nuclear Physics during the 1930s | |
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Types of Conceptual Change | |
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Revolutionary Change | |
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The Gadow Taxonomy: Revolutionary Change without Communication Failure | |
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Noddack, Fermi, and Fission: Revolutionary Change with Communication Failure | |
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Conclusion: A Place for the Cognitive History of Science | |
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Incommensurability | |
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Introduction | |
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The Development of Kuhn's Concept of Incommensurability | |
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Representing Incommensurability in Frames | |
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Galileo's Discoveries and the Conceptual Structure of Astronomy | |
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The Copernican Revolution | |
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The Conceptual Structure of Ptolemaic Astronomy | |
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The Conceptual Structure of Copernican Astronomy | |
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The Problem of the Equant Point | |
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From Orbs to Orbits | |
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The Conceptual Structure of Kepler's Astronomy | |
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Incommensurability, Incremental Change, and the Copernican Revolution | |
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Realism, History, and Cognitive Studies of Science | |
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Results | |
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Realism | |
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Incommensurability and Realism | |
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Entities in a Phenomenal World | |
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Anomalies and Restructuring of the Phenomenal World | |
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Chain-of-Reasoning Arguments, Conceptual Continuity, and Incommensurability | |
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The Symmetry Thesis | |
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References | |
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Index | |