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Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

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ISBN-10: 0521855268

ISBN-13: 9780521855266

Edition: 2005

Authors: Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson

List price: $64.99
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The authors develop a framework for analysing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Dictatorship, nevertheless, is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution.
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Book details

List price: $64.99
Copyright year: 2005
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 12/19/2005
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 434
Size: 6.50" wide x 9.75" long x 1.25" tall
Weight: 1.628
Language: English

James A. Robinson is Professor of Government, Harvard University.

Questions and Answers
Paths of Political Development
South Africa
The Agenda
Our Argument
Democracy versus Nondemocracy
Building Blocks of Our Approach
Toward Our Basic Story
Our Theory of Democratization
Democratic Consolidation
Determinants of Democracy
Political Identities and the Nature of Conflict
Democracy in a Picture
Overview of the Book
What Do We Know about Democracy?
Measuring Democracy
Patterns of Democracy
Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution
Crises and Democracy
Social Unrest and Democratization
The Literature
Our Contribution
Modeling Politics
Democratic Politics
Aggregating Individual Preferences
Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem
Our Workhorse Models
Democracy and Political Equality
Nondemocratic Politics
Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics
Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies
Commitment Problems
A Simple Game of Promises
A Dynamic Model
Incentive-Compatible Promises
The Creation and Consolidation of Democracy
The Role of Political Institutions
Preferences over Political Institutions
Political Power and Institutions
A Static Model of Democratization
Democratization or Repression?
A Dynamic Model of Democratization
Subgame Perfect Equilibria
Alternative Political Identities
Targeted Transfers
Power of the Elites in Democracy
Ideological Preferences over Regimes
Democratization in a Picture
Equilibrium Revolutions
Coups and Consolidation
Incentives for Coups
A Static Model of Coups
A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy
Alternative Political Identities
Targeted Transfers
Power in Democracy and Coups
Consolidation in a Picture
Defensive Coups
Putting the Models to Work
The Role of the Middle Class
The Three-Class Model
Emergence of Partial Democracy
From Partial to Full Democracy
Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer
Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners
The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy
Economic Structure and Democracy
Economic Structure and Income Distribution
Political Conflict
Capital, Land, and the Transition to Democracy
Costs of Coup on Capital and Land
Capital, Land, and the Burden of Democracy
Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists
Industrialists, Landowners, and Democracy in Practice
Economic Institutions
Human Capital
Conjectures about Political Development
Globalization and Democracy
A Model of an Open Economy
Political Conflict - Democratic Consolidation
Political Conflict - Transition to Democracy
Financial Integration
Increased Political Integration
Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade
Conclusions and the Future of Democracy
Conclusions and the Future of Democracy
Paths of Political Development Revisited
Extensions and Areas for Future Research
The Future of Democracy
Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy
Probabilistic Voting Models
Partisan Politics and Political Capture