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Courts under Constraints Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina

ISBN-10: 0521820596

ISBN-13: 9780521820592

Edition: 2004

Authors: Gretchen Helmke, Robert H. Bates, Ellen Comisso, Peter Hall, Peter Lange

List price: $108.00
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Description:

This study offers a new theoretical framework for understanding how institutional instability affects judicial behavior under dictatorship and democracy. In stark contrast to conventional wisdom, the central findings of the book contradict the longstanding assumption that only independent judges rule against the government of the day. Set in the context of Argentina, the study uses the tools of positive political theory to explore the conditions under which courts rule against the government. In addition to shedding new light on the dynamics of court-executive relations in Argentina, the study provides general lessons about institutions, instability, and the rule of law. In the process, the study builds a new set of connections among diverse bodies of scholarship, including US judicial politics, comparative institutional analysis, positive political theory, and Latin American politics.
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Book details

List price: $108.00
Copyright year: 2004
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 12/27/2004
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 242
Size: 6.00" wide x 9.00" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 0.990
Language: English

Ruling against the Rules
Introduction
Actors, institutions, and mechanisms
Design and overview of the argument
The Logic of Strategic Defection
The standard strategic account
A new pattern of inter-branch relations
Modifying the separations-of-powers approach
Judicial motivations
Problems of information
Conclusion
A Theory of Court-Executive Relations: Insecure Tenure, Incomplete Information, and Strategic Behavior
Politics and uncertainty
The model
Discussion
Conclusion: testable hypotheses
Judges, Generals, and Presidents: Institutional Insecurity on the Argentine Supreme Court, 1976���99
The gap between formal and informal institutions
Judges under bayonets: the military 'Proceso', 1976���83
Judges under the Alfosán government
Judges under the (first) Menem government: the difficulty of democratic consolidation, 1989���95
Judges under the (Second) Menem government: the path toward democratic consolidation?
Conclusion: an analytic narrative of institutional insecurity
The Reverse Legal-Political Cycle: An Analysis of Decision-Making on the Argentine Supreme Court
Data and methodology
Timing
Importance
Participation
Target of the threat
Rival hypotheses: composition, legality, and the mix of cases
Conclusion
The Dynamics of Defection: Human Rights, Civil Liberties, and Presidential Power
The military court and human rights
The Alfonsán Court and human and civil rights
The Menem-era court and presidential power
Conclusion: did defection work?
Epilogue: the court and the collapse of Argentina
Conclusion: Broader Lessons and Future Directions
Strategic defection and the reverse-legal-political cycle
Strategic defection in comparative perspective
Further implications, future directions