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| Ruling against the Rules | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Actors, institutions, and mechanisms | |
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| Design and overview of the argument | |
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| The Logic of Strategic Defection | |
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| The standard strategic account | |
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| A new pattern of inter-branch relations | |
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| Modifying the separations-of-powers approach | |
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| Judicial motivations | |
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| Problems of information | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| A Theory of Court-Executive Relations: Insecure Tenure, Incomplete Information, and Strategic Behavior | |
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| Politics and uncertainty | |
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| The model | |
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| Discussion | |
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| Conclusion: testable hypotheses | |
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| Judges, Generals, and Presidents: Institutional Insecurity on the Argentine Supreme Court, 1976���99 | |
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| The gap between formal and informal institutions | |
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| Judges under bayonets: the military 'Proceso', 1976���83 | |
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| Judges under the Alfosán government | |
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| Judges under the (first) Menem government: the difficulty of democratic consolidation, 1989���95 | |
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| Judges under the (Second) Menem government: the path toward democratic consolidation? | |
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| Conclusion: an analytic narrative of institutional insecurity | |
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| The Reverse Legal-Political Cycle: An Analysis of Decision-Making on the Argentine Supreme Court | |
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| Data and methodology | |
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| Timing | |
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| Importance | |
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| Participation | |
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| Target of the threat | |
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| Rival hypotheses: composition, legality, and the mix of cases | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| The Dynamics of Defection: Human Rights, Civil Liberties, and Presidential Power | |
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| The military court and human rights | |
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| The Alfonsán Court and human and civil rights | |
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| The Menem-era court and presidential power | |
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| Conclusion: did defection work? | |
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| Epilogue: the court and the collapse of Argentina | |
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| Conclusion: Broader Lessons and Future Directions | |
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| Strategic defection and the reverse-legal-political cycle | |
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| Strategic defection in comparative perspective | |
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| Further implications, future directions | |