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| List of figures and tables | |
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| Acknowledgments | |
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| List of abbreviations | |
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| Preface | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Research aims and strategy | |
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| Local officials in the Chinese political system | |
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| Investment policy conflicts in China | |
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| Some definitions | |
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| Organization of the book | |
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| The economic and political roles of local government officials | |
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| Local government officials as economic agents | |
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| Central-local economic institutional arrangements | |
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| Control over economic resources | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Appendix | |
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| Local bureaucrats as investors: The investment roles of local governments | |
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| The evolution of the Chinese investment system before the reform era | |
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| Local investment controls and development imperatives | |
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| Investment management | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| The local officials in the bureaucratic hierarchy | |
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| The cadre management system | |
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| Monitoring in the Chinese bureaucratic system | |
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| Central administrative control during the reform era | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Appendix | |
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| Macroeconomic policy developments during the reform era | |
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| Excess investment demand and austerity policies | |
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| Excess investment demand in China | |
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| Central investment concerns during the reform era | |
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| Austerity policies | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Analyzing local investment behavior | |
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| Explaining local investment behavior | |
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| An analytical framework | |
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| A bureaucratic model of investment behavior | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Appendix | |
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| Strategic investment behavior during austerity | |
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| Aggregate impact of austerity policies | |
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| Monitoring and investment behavior | |
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| Monitoring and investment behavior: Empirical evidence | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Appendix | |
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| Bureaucratic investment behavior | |
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| Model building | |
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| Bureaucratic status and investment behavior | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Appendix | |
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| Conclusion: Political institutions, inflation control, and economic reforms | |
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| Summary of findings | |
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| The nature of Chinese political institutions | |
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| Political institutions, inflation control, and economic reforms | |
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| References | |
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| Name index | |
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| Subject index | |