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| Preface | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The geography of the issues | |
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| Conceptual versus natural modality | |
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| Implications for philosophy and psychology | |
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| Of wolves and wolf-children | |
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| Stalnaker's intelligent Martians | |
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| Anti-realist arguments | |
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| Realism in mind | |
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| Innateness and theory of mind | |
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| Thinking: images or sentences? | |
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| Which language do we think with? | |
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| The evidence from scientific psychology | |
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| The evidence of introspection: images and imaged sentences | |
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| The scope and strength of the introspective thesis | |
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| Objections and elucidations | |
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| Fallible introspection and Fodor | |
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| Individuating propositional attitudes | |
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| Animals and infants | |
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| Language-learning and sub-personal thought | |
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| Thought-based semantics | |
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| The argument from foreign believers | |
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| Grice's thought-based semantics | |
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| Two objections | |
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| Searle's version of thought-based semantics | |
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| A marriage of Searle and Fodor? | |
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| Causal co-variance theories | |
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| Misrepresentation, and asymmetric causal dependence | |
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| The all Ss problem | |
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| Holism and language | |
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| From mental realism to Mentalese | |
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| The demand for scientific vindication | |
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| The problem of holism | |
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| Between holism and atomism | |
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| Arguments for holism | |
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| The need for a language-based semantics | |
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| Language-based semantics 1: functional-role semantics | |
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| Language-based semantics 2: canonical acceptance conditions | |
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| First steps towards a theory of consciousness | |
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| Retrospect: the need for a theory of consciousness | |
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| Conscious versus non-conscious mental states | |
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| Cartesian consciousness | |
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| Why Cartesianism won't do | |
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| What kind of theory do we want? | |
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| Kirk: presence to central decision-making | |
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| Higher-order discrimination and feel | |
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| The case for higher-order thought theory | |
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| Second (-order) steps towards a theory of consciousness | |
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| Theory 1: actual and conscious | |
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| Theory 2: actual and non-conscious | |
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| Theory 3: potential and non-conscious | |
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| Theory 4: potential and conscious | |
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| Dennett 1978: availability to print-out | |
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| Dennett 1991: multiple drafts and probes | |
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| Time and indeterminacy | |
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| Dennett on the place of language in thought | |
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| A reflexive thinking theory of consciousness | |
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| Reflexive thinking theory | |
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| Contrasts and advantages | |
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| Conscious versus non-conscious thinking | |
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| Objections and elucidations | |
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| The problem of unity | |
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| The problem of phenomenal feel | |
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| A Cartesian Theatre? | |
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| Animals and infants revisited | |
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| The involvement of language in conscious thinking | |
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| An architecture for human thinking | |
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| An evolutionary story | |
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| The argument from introspection revisited | |
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| Working memory and the central executive | |
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| The thesis of natural necessity (weak) | |
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| Objections and elucidations | |
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| The thesis of natural necessity (strong) | |
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| The scope and significance of NN | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| References | |
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| Index | |