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Contribution to the Pure Theory of Taxation

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ISBN-10: 052162956X

ISBN-13: 9780521629560

Edition: 1998

Authors: Roger Guesnerie, Peter Hammond, Alberto Holly, Andrew Chesher, Matthew Jackson

List price: $50.99
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Description:

Now available in paperback this book investigates the way in which tax systems affect economic efficiency and the distribution of welfare. It examines within a unified framework questions that are usually treated in different areas of the literature: institutional economics, positive economics, normative economics, and political economics. It adheres to the rigorous standards of pure theory while paying careful attention to the policy relevance of the arguments. Tax systems are viewed as information extracting devices that generate sets of equilibria of complex geometry. A tax reform methodology is proposed that sheds light on optimal taxes. Social conflicts in the determination of taxes…    
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Book details

List price: $50.99
Copyright year: 1998
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 11/12/1998
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 316
Size: 5.98" wide x 9.02" long x 0.71" tall
Weight: 1.034
Language: English

Introduction
An overview of Chapter 1: the institutional economics of taxation
A presentation of the model
An overview of Chapter 2: positive economics
An overview of Chapter 3: normative economics of taxation
An overview of Chapter 4: normative economics of taxation: further issues
An overview of Chapter 5: the political economics of taxation
Institutional economics of taxation
Introduction
The model
Allocation via game forms
Tax systems versus game forms
More on game forms versus tax systems
Coming back on the anonymity assumption
Conclusion
Bibliographical note
Positive economics: the structure of tax equilibria
The basic model
The local structure of the set of tax equilibria
The global structure of the set of tax equilibria
Positive economics: tax equilibrium and tax incidence
Bibliographical note
Normative economics of taxation: reform and optimization
Tax reform, the canonical argument
Tax reform: a closer examination of specific situations
Tax reform: from infinitesimal to finite changes-algorithms of tax reform
Tax reform - further discussions
Second-best Pareto optima
Bibliographical note
Normative economics of taxation: further essays on optimization and reform
The social values of commodities
Non-linearities and quotas policies
Optimal taxes and tax reform in a one-consumer economy
Mixing linear and non-linear taxation; a bird's eye view
Bibliographical note
Political economics of taxation
Introduction
The structure of the set of Pareto optimal tax equilibria
Taxation as a social choice or a game theoretical problem
A one-dimensional version of the taxation game
Further remarks on the one-dimensional taxation game
Bibliographical note
Conclusion
Mathematical appendix
Bibliography
Index