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Valuing Emotions

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ISBN-10: 0521567866

ISBN-13: 9780521567862

Edition: 1996

Authors: Michael Stocker, Jonathan Dancy, John Haldane, Gilbert Harman, Elizabeth Hegeman

List price: $57.99
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Stocker places emotions at the very centre of human identity, life and value. He shows the importance of the social and emotional contexts of ethical dilemmas and inner conflicts, challenging over-generalised philosophical theories.
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Book details

List price: $57.99
Copyright year: 1996
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 9/13/1996
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 384
Size: 5.71" wide x 8.74" long x 1.10" tall
Weight: 1.232
Language: English

Gilbert Harman is Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University and the author of Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy and Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind.

Preliminary Material
The Irreducibility of Affectivity
Emotions and affectivity
The content account
Irreducibility to desire
Irreducibility to reason
Irreducibility via more complex accounts
Feelings are rarely merely feelings
Concluding remarks
How Emotions Reveal Value
A start on some issues
Problematic issues about the values emotions reveal
Whether all emotions contain or reveal value, with special focus on interest and intellectual emotions
Some relations between my claim and emotivism and naturalism
Perhaps evaluatively revealing emotions only reveal values
The unsavory connection between the content claim and the information claim
Emotions and Value: Some Epistemological and Constitutive Relations
Emotional Problems Suggest Epistemological Problems
False truisms about reason and emotions
Psychoanalytic connections
Unhealthy philosophical accounts of emotions
Ordinary ways good emotions are important for good evaluations
Do These Connections Show Emotions Important for Value, or do They Show Something Else?
Do emotional defects explain evaluative defects, or do they share a common cause?
Is there a real or healthy distinction between emotions and their underlying patterns?
Perhaps emotions are important, not for evaluations, but only for people as evaluators
Is this just the information claim?
Emotions are Important for Evaluation and Value
Medical treatment
Justice and formalistic ethics
The right of self-defense and emotions
How being a good person and acting well requires emotions
Many ordinary goods, especially interpersonal ones, are emotional
Emotions as Constituents and as Added Perfections
Emotions as added perfections
Emotions as constituents
Further issues
A suggestion about pleasure in books VII and X of the Nicomachean Ethics
How we are also Aristotelians about pleasure
Some Further Ways Emotions Help With Evaluative Knowledge
Emotions as epistemologically useful for justifications and for countertransference
Some other claims about the epistemological usefulness of emotions
Some general points about emotions and practical, often unarticulated, evaluative knowledge
How emotional-evaluative knowledge can be practical
Emotions as important, but perhaps not necessary, for evaluative knowledge
Case Studies: Philosophical and Other Complexities of Emotions
The Interdependence of Emotions and Psychology
Killing another person--just by way of example
Empathy and sympathy
Painful emotions
Affectivity and Self-Concern
Spiritual maladies
Anger and pride
Harm, fear, and pity
Pity and self-pity
Concluding remarks
The Complex Evaluative World of Aristotle's Angry Man
Orge and value
Narcissism and Aristotle's angry man
Slights, flattery, and recognition by others
The personal and the impersonal in some emotions
Who gets angry on behalf of whom
Closeness and identification
Some Final Conclusions
Subject Index
Name Index
Index of Aristotelian and Platonic Sources