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Putting Auction Theory to Work

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ISBN-10: 0521536723

ISBN-13: 9780521536721

Edition: 2003

Authors: Paul Milgrom

List price: $54.99
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Description:

This volume provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used.
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Book details

List price: $54.99
Copyright year: 2003
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 1/12/2004
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 396
Size: 6.00" wide x 8.75" long x 1.00" tall
Weight: 1.188
Language: English

Preface
Foreword
Getting to Work
Politics Sets the Stage
Designing for Multiple Goals
Substitutes and Complements
New Zealand's Rights Auction
Better Auction Designs
The FCC Design and Its Progeny
Comparing Seller Revenues
The Academic Critics
Resale and the Coase Theorem
Mechanism Design Theory
Theory and Experiment
Practical Concerns
Plan for This Book
The Mechanism Design Approach
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
Formulation
Always Optimal and Weakly Dominant Strategies
Balancing the Budget
Uniqueness
Disadvantages of the Vickrey Auction
Practical Disadvantages
Monotonicity Problems
The Merger-Investment Disadvantage
Conclusion
The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence
Hotelling's Lemma
The Envelope Theorem in Integral Form
Quasi-linear Payoffs
Holmstrom's Lemma
The Green-Laffont-Holmstrom Theorem
Myerson's Lemma
Revenue Equivalence Theorems
The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem
The Jehiel-Moldovanu Impossibility Theorems
Myerson and Riley-Samuelson Revenue-Maximizing Auctions
The McAfee-McMillan Weak-Cartels Theorem
Sequential Auctions and Weber's Martingale Theorem
Matthews Theorem: Risk Averse Payoff Equivalence
Conclusion
Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences
The Single Crossing Conditions
The Monotonic Selection Theorem
The Sufficiency Theorem
The Constraint Simplification Theorem
The Mirrlees-Spence Representation Theorem
Deriving and Verifying Equilibrium Strategies
The Second-Price Auction with a Reserve Price
The Sealed Tender, or First-Price, Auction
The War of Attrition Auction
The All-Pay Auction
Revenue Comparisons in the Benchmark Model
Payoff Equivalence without Revenue Equivalence
Budget Constraints
Endogenous Quantities
Correlated Types
Expected-Revenue-Maximizing Auctions
Myerson's Theorem
Bulow-Klemperer Theorem
The Irregular Case
Auctions with Weak and Strong Bidders
Conclusion
Interdependence of Types and Values
Which Models and Assumptions are "Useful"?
Payoffs Depend Only on Bids and Types
Types Are One-Dimensional and Values Are Private
Types Are Statistically Independent
Statistical Dependence and Revenue-Maximizing Auctions
Wilson's Drainage Tract Model
Equilibrium
Profits and Revenues
Bidder Information Policy
Seller Information Policy
Correlated Types and Interdependent Values
Affiliation
The Milgrom-Weber Ascending Auction Models
The (Second-Price) Button Auction with Minimal Information
The Button Auction with Maximal Information
Some Revenue Comparisons
First-Price Auctions
Conclusion
Auctions in Context
The Profit and Surplus Contribution of an Entrant
Symmetric Models with Costly Entry
Symmetric Bidders and Uncoordinated Entry
Equilibrium in Entry and Bidding Decisions
Setting the Reserve Price
Coordinating Entry among Symmetric Competitors
Pre-qualifying Bidders
Auctions, Negotiations, and Posted Prices
Buy Prices
Asymmetric Models: Devices to Promote Competition
Example of Set-asides
Example of Bidding Credits
Example of Lot Structure and Consolation Prizes
Premium Auctions
Dutch vs. English Auctions and the Anglo-Dutch Design
After the Bidding Ends
Bankruptcy and Non-performance
Scoring Rules vs. Price-Only Bids
Conclusion
Multi-Unit Auctions
Uniform Price Auctions
Uniform Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
Demand Reduction
Low-Price Equilibria
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
The Simultaneous Ascending Auction and the Walrasian Tatonnement
Clock Auctions
Strategic Incentives in Uniform Price Auctions
The Basic Clock Auction Model
The Alternating-Move Clock Auction
Strategic Incentives with Elastic Supply
Conclusion
Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding
Vickrey Auctions and the Monotonicity Problems
Bidders' Vickrey Payoffs Bound Their Core Payoffs
Vickrey Auctions and the Entry Puzzle
When Are Vickrey Outcomes in the Core?
Substitute Goods and Core Outcomes
Substitute Goods and Vickrey Outcomes
Bernheim-Whinston First-Price Package Auctions
Formulation
Profit-Target Strategies
Equilibrium and the Core
Ausubel-Milgrom Ascending Proxy Auctions
The Proxy Auction with Unlimited Budgets
Proxy Outcomes Are Core Outcomes
Profit-Target Strategies and Equilibrium
The Proxy Auction When Goods Are Substitutes
The Non-transferable-Utility Proxy Auction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Author Index
Subject Index