| |
| |
Preface | |
| |
| |
Foreword | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
Getting to Work | |
| |
| |
| |
Politics Sets the Stage | |
| |
| |
| |
Designing for Multiple Goals | |
| |
| |
| |
Substitutes and Complements | |
| |
| |
| |
New Zealand's Rights Auction | |
| |
| |
| |
Better Auction Designs | |
| |
| |
| |
The FCC Design and Its Progeny | |
| |
| |
| |
Comparing Seller Revenues | |
| |
| |
| |
The Academic Critics | |
| |
| |
| |
Resale and the Coase Theorem | |
| |
| |
| |
Mechanism Design Theory | |
| |
| |
| |
Theory and Experiment | |
| |
| |
| |
Practical Concerns | |
| |
| |
| |
Plan for This Book | |
| |
| |
| |
The Mechanism Design Approach | |
| |
| |
| |
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms | |
| |
| |
| |
Formulation | |
| |
| |
| |
Always Optimal and Weakly Dominant Strategies | |
| |
| |
| |
Balancing the Budget | |
| |
| |
| |
Uniqueness | |
| |
| |
| |
Disadvantages of the Vickrey Auction | |
| |
| |
| |
Practical Disadvantages | |
| |
| |
| |
Monotonicity Problems | |
| |
| |
| |
The Merger-Investment Disadvantage | |
| |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
| |
The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence | |
| |
| |
| |
Hotelling's Lemma | |
| |
| |
| |
The Envelope Theorem in Integral Form | |
| |
| |
| |
Quasi-linear Payoffs | |
| |
| |
| |
Holmstrom's Lemma | |
| |
| |
| |
The Green-Laffont-Holmstrom Theorem | |
| |
| |
| |
Myerson's Lemma | |
| |
| |
| |
Revenue Equivalence Theorems | |
| |
| |
| |
The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem | |
| |
| |
| |
The Jehiel-Moldovanu Impossibility Theorems | |
| |
| |
| |
Myerson and Riley-Samuelson Revenue-Maximizing Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
The McAfee-McMillan Weak-Cartels Theorem | |
| |
| |
| |
Sequential Auctions and Weber's Martingale Theorem | |
| |
| |
| |
Matthews Theorem: Risk Averse Payoff Equivalence | |
| |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
| |
Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences | |
| |
| |
| |
The Single Crossing Conditions | |
| |
| |
| |
The Monotonic Selection Theorem | |
| |
| |
| |
The Sufficiency Theorem | |
| |
| |
| |
The Constraint Simplification Theorem | |
| |
| |
| |
The Mirrlees-Spence Representation Theorem | |
| |
| |
| |
Deriving and Verifying Equilibrium Strategies | |
| |
| |
| |
The Second-Price Auction with a Reserve Price | |
| |
| |
| |
The Sealed Tender, or First-Price, Auction | |
| |
| |
| |
The War of Attrition Auction | |
| |
| |
| |
The All-Pay Auction | |
| |
| |
| |
Revenue Comparisons in the Benchmark Model | |
| |
| |
| |
Payoff Equivalence without Revenue Equivalence | |
| |
| |
| |
Budget Constraints | |
| |
| |
| |
Endogenous Quantities | |
| |
| |
| |
Correlated Types | |
| |
| |
| |
Expected-Revenue-Maximizing Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
Myerson's Theorem | |
| |
| |
| |
Bulow-Klemperer Theorem | |
| |
| |
| |
The Irregular Case | |
| |
| |
| |
Auctions with Weak and Strong Bidders | |
| |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
| |
Interdependence of Types and Values | |
| |
| |
| |
Which Models and Assumptions are "Useful"? | |
| |
| |
| |
Payoffs Depend Only on Bids and Types | |
| |
| |
| |
Types Are One-Dimensional and Values Are Private | |
| |
| |
| |
Types Are Statistically Independent | |
| |
| |
| |
Statistical Dependence and Revenue-Maximizing Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
Wilson's Drainage Tract Model | |
| |
| |
| |
Equilibrium | |
| |
| |
| |
Profits and Revenues | |
| |
| |
| |
Bidder Information Policy | |
| |
| |
| |
Seller Information Policy | |
| |
| |
| |
Correlated Types and Interdependent Values | |
| |
| |
| |
Affiliation | |
| |
| |
| |
The Milgrom-Weber Ascending Auction Models | |
| |
| |
| |
The (Second-Price) Button Auction with Minimal Information | |
| |
| |
| |
The Button Auction with Maximal Information | |
| |
| |
| |
Some Revenue Comparisons | |
| |
| |
| |
First-Price Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
| |
Auctions in Context | |
| |
| |
| |
The Profit and Surplus Contribution of an Entrant | |
| |
| |
| |
Symmetric Models with Costly Entry | |
| |
| |
| |
Symmetric Bidders and Uncoordinated Entry | |
| |
| |
| |
Equilibrium in Entry and Bidding Decisions | |
| |
| |
| |
Setting the Reserve Price | |
| |
| |
| |
Coordinating Entry among Symmetric Competitors | |
| |
| |
| |
Pre-qualifying Bidders | |
| |
| |
| |
Auctions, Negotiations, and Posted Prices | |
| |
| |
| |
Buy Prices | |
| |
| |
| |
Asymmetric Models: Devices to Promote Competition | |
| |
| |
| |
Example of Set-asides | |
| |
| |
| |
Example of Bidding Credits | |
| |
| |
| |
Example of Lot Structure and Consolation Prizes | |
| |
| |
| |
Premium Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
Dutch vs. English Auctions and the Anglo-Dutch Design | |
| |
| |
| |
After the Bidding Ends | |
| |
| |
| |
Bankruptcy and Non-performance | |
| |
| |
| |
Scoring Rules vs. Price-Only Bids | |
| |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
| |
Multi-Unit Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
Uniform Price Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
Uniform Price Sealed-Bid Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
Demand Reduction | |
| |
| |
| |
Low-Price Equilibria | |
| |
| |
| |
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
The Simultaneous Ascending Auction and the Walrasian Tatonnement | |
| |
| |
| |
Clock Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
Strategic Incentives in Uniform Price Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
The Basic Clock Auction Model | |
| |
| |
| |
The Alternating-Move Clock Auction | |
| |
| |
| |
Strategic Incentives with Elastic Supply | |
| |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
| |
Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding | |
| |
| |
| |
Vickrey Auctions and the Monotonicity Problems | |
| |
| |
| |
Bidders' Vickrey Payoffs Bound Their Core Payoffs | |
| |
| |
| |
Vickrey Auctions and the Entry Puzzle | |
| |
| |
| |
When Are Vickrey Outcomes in the Core? | |
| |
| |
| |
Substitute Goods and Core Outcomes | |
| |
| |
| |
Substitute Goods and Vickrey Outcomes | |
| |
| |
| |
Bernheim-Whinston First-Price Package Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
Formulation | |
| |
| |
| |
Profit-Target Strategies | |
| |
| |
| |
Equilibrium and the Core | |
| |
| |
| |
Ausubel-Milgrom Ascending Proxy Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
The Proxy Auction with Unlimited Budgets | |
| |
| |
| |
Proxy Outcomes Are Core Outcomes | |
| |
| |
| |
Profit-Target Strategies and Equilibrium | |
| |
| |
| |
The Proxy Auction When Goods Are Substitutes | |
| |
| |
| |
The Non-transferable-Utility Proxy Auction | |
| |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
Bibliography | |
| |
| |
Author Index | |
| |
| |
Subject Index | |