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| Preface | |
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| Acknowledgements | |
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| The problem of knowledge | |
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| Knowledge as justified true belief | |
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| Some objections to the justified true belief account | |
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| Dogmatism, scepticism and infinite regresses | |
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| Stopping the regresses: empiricism and rationalism | |
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| Scepticism under attack | |
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| Is scepticism consistent? | |
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| Is scepticism impractical? | |
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| Does scepticism matter? | |
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| Scepticism regarding the senses | |
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| Sextus Empiricus versus empiricism | |
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| An Aristotelian reply | |
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| How belief and experience interact | |
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| The problem of perceptual error | |
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| Bacon's cure | |
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| Observation is theory-laden | |
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| Empiricist psychology | |
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| The bucket theory of the mind | |
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| Tradition and the importance of language | |
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| Language learning | |
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| The role of repetition | |
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| Innate ideas or inborn know-how? | |
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| Idea-ism, appearance and reality | |
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| A new empiricism--idea-ism | |
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| Reifying the data | |
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| The causal theory of perception and the time-lapse argument | |
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| The sceptic fights back--appearance and reality again | |
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| Primary and secondary qualities | |
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| The distinction before Locke | |
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| Locke's theory | |
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| Are secondary qualities subjective? | |
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| Berkeley's critique of Locke | |
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| Berkeley: idea-ism becomes idealism | |
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| How to turn appearance into reality | |
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| Immaterialism | |
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| God and other minds | |
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| Immaterialism, phenomenalism and science | |
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| Hume: idea-ism becomes irrationalism | |
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| Hume's irrationalism | |
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| Hume and external objects | |
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| Hume's inductive scepticism | |
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| Countering Hume on induction | |
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| The appeal to inductive principles | |
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| Probabilism | |
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| The 'No true Scotsman' ploy | |
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| Non-deductivism | |
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| Deductivism | |
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| The rationalist alternative | |
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| The rationalist paradigm--Euclid | |
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| Why mathematical knowledge is a problem for empiricists | |
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| Three sceptical objections | |
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| Rationalism defended: Descartes | |
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| Systematic doubt and the Cogito | |
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| Metaphysical doubt and the evil genius | |
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| God and the Cartesian circle | |
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| Kant and the synthetic a priori | |
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| Kant's question | |
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| Kant's answer | |
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| Kant's idealism | |
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| Alternative geometries | |
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| How non-Euclidean geometries were invented | |
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| Why non-Euclidean geometries are philosophically important | |
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| Logical empiricists take comfort | |
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| Platonism and logicism about mathematics | |
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| Truth and truth-theories | |
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| The problem of truth and its common-sense solution | |
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| Subjective truth-theories | |
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| Tarski's T-scheme | |
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| Conceptual idealism | |
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| The liar paradox and Godel's incompleteness theorem | |
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| Fallibilist realism | |
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| Sophisticated indirect realism about perception | |
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| Scepticism, irrationalism and fallibilism | |
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| Fallibilism and the grue problem | |
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| New objections | |
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| Conjectural knowledge | |
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| References | |
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| Index | |