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Knowledge and Evidence

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ISBN-10: 0521423635

ISBN-13: 9780521423632

Edition: N/A

Authors: Paul K. Moser, Jonathan Dancy, John Haldane, Gilbert Harman, Frank Jackson

List price: $58.00
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Description:

Paul Moser's book defends what has been an unfashionable view in recent epistemology: the foundationalist account of knowledge and justification. Since the time of Plato philosophers have wondered what exactly knowledge is. This book develops a new account of perceptual knowledge which specifies the exact sense in which knowledge has foundations. The author argues that experiential foundations are indeed essential to perceptual knowledge, and he explains what knowledge requires beyond justified true beliefs. In challenging prominent sceptical claims that we have no justified beliefs about the external world, the book outlines a theory of rational belief.
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Book details

List price: $58.00
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 7/26/1991
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 300
Size: 5.75" wide x 8.75" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 0.748
Language: English

Gilbert Harman is Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University and the author of Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy and Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind.

Acknowledgments
Introduction
Conditions for propositional knowledge
Belief
Truth as minimal correspondence
Truth as correspondence
The minimal correspondence definition
Criticisms and replies
Epistemic justification
Conclusion
Minimal epistemic reasons
Minimal epistemic reasons for belief
Propositional probability-makers
Against the Thesis of Self-Probability
Against Probability Infinitism
Circular Probability and Probability Coherentism
Summary and generalized argument
Nonpropositional probability-makers
Against Externalism
Against Radical Externalism
Against Moderate Externalism
A positive lesson
Internalism and unconditional probability-makers
Modes of awareness
Unconditional probability-makers
Internalism unified
Internalism and derivative probability-makers
Nonoccurrent probability-makers and memory
Conclusion
Justifying epistemic reasons
Justification and overbalancing probability
Unconditional overbalancing probability
Derivative overbalancing probability
The insufficiency of overbalancing probability
Justification and maximal probability
Unconditional and derivative justifiers
Justifiability and justifiedness
Some logical matters
Having a justifying reason for belief
The evidential basing relation
Against justification skepticism
Conclusion
Foundationalism and some alternatives
Foundationalism is not a mistake
Two problems for coherentism
A dilemma for internalist coherentism
The isolation objection
Against epistemological behaviorism
The given is not a myth
Epistemic reliabilism and relevant worlds
Three variations on reliabilism
Normal-world reliabilism
Reliabilism rejected
Conclusion
Procedural epistemic rationality
Cartesian truth-seekers
A plethora of epistemic objectives
Purely quantitative approaches
Nonquantitative approaches
An evidential epistemic objective
Conclusion
Propositional knowledge
Epistemic explanation and the Gettier problem
Knowledge and truth-resistant evidence
Knowledge skepticism and meta-justification
Knowledge and a Cartesian Dreamer Hypothesis
Explanatory particularism and the problem of the criterion
Conclusion
References
Index