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| Acknowledgments | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Conditions for propositional knowledge | |
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| Belief | |
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| Truth as minimal correspondence | |
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| Truth as correspondence | |
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| The minimal correspondence definition | |
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| Criticisms and replies | |
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| Epistemic justification | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Minimal epistemic reasons | |
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| Minimal epistemic reasons for belief | |
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| Propositional probability-makers | |
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| Against the Thesis of Self-Probability | |
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| Against Probability Infinitism | |
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| Circular Probability and Probability Coherentism | |
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| Summary and generalized argument | |
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| Nonpropositional probability-makers | |
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| Against Externalism | |
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| Against Radical Externalism | |
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| Against Moderate Externalism | |
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| A positive lesson | |
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| Internalism and unconditional probability-makers | |
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| Modes of awareness | |
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| Unconditional probability-makers | |
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| Internalism unified | |
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| Internalism and derivative probability-makers | |
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| Nonoccurrent probability-makers and memory | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Justifying epistemic reasons | |
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| Justification and overbalancing probability | |
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| Unconditional overbalancing probability | |
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| Derivative overbalancing probability | |
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| The insufficiency of overbalancing probability | |
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| Justification and maximal probability | |
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| Unconditional and derivative justifiers | |
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| Justifiability and justifiedness | |
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| Some logical matters | |
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| Having a justifying reason for belief | |
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| The evidential basing relation | |
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| Against justification skepticism | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Foundationalism and some alternatives | |
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| Foundationalism is not a mistake | |
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| Two problems for coherentism | |
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| A dilemma for internalist coherentism | |
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| The isolation objection | |
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| Against epistemological behaviorism | |
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| The given is not a myth | |
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| Epistemic reliabilism and relevant worlds | |
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| Three variations on reliabilism | |
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| Normal-world reliabilism | |
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| Reliabilism rejected | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Procedural epistemic rationality | |
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| Cartesian truth-seekers | |
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| A plethora of epistemic objectives | |
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| Purely quantitative approaches | |
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| Nonquantitative approaches | |
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| An evidential epistemic objective | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Propositional knowledge | |
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| Epistemic explanation and the Gettier problem | |
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| Knowledge and truth-resistant evidence | |
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| Knowledge skepticism and meta-justification | |
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| Knowledge and a Cartesian Dreamer Hypothesis | |
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| Explanatory particularism and the problem of the criterion | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| References | |
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| Index | |