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| Acknowledgements | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The topic of this book: self-knowledge and self-awareness | |
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| Self-knowledge | |
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| The problem of self-knowledge | |
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| Theories of self-knowledge | |
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| Self-awareness | |
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| Some philosophical implications of these theories | |
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| Self-knowledge and the distinctiveness of the mental | |
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| Self-knowledge and epistemic justification | |
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| Self-knowledge and perceptual knowledge | |
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| Self-awareness and personal identity | |
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| Outline of the book | |
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| Summary | |
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| Further reading | |
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| Historical background | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Creeks: the importance of knowing one's nature | |
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| Descartes: self-knowledge as an epistemic foundation | |
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| Introspection and the doctrine of innate ideas | |
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| Self-knowledge and epistemic internalism | |
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| Self-knowledge and epistemic foundationalism | |
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| Knowledge of the self and mind-body dualism | |
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| Locke: the inner sense theory | |
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| Inner sense and knowledge | |
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| Inner sense and consciousness | |
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| Inner sense and personal identity | |
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| Kant: self-knowledge and rational agency | |
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| Wittgenstein and Ryle: doubts about self-knowledge | |
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| Wittgenstein's doubts: privacy and epistemic significance | |
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| Wittgensteinian alternatives: the default authority and expressivist views | |
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| Ryle: self-knowledge as theorizing | |
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| Summary | |
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| Further reading | |
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| The nature and scope of (purportedly) special self-knowledge | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Self-knowledge as special, relative to other sorts of knowledge | |
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| Self-knowledge as especially secure, epidemically | |
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| Self-knowledge as achieved through a unique epistemic method | |
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| Self-knowledge as special in a nonepistemic way | |
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| Limits to the domain of privileged access | |
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| Character traits, affective forecasting, and causal sources of actions and attitudes | |
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| Moods and emotions | |
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| Dispositional beliefs and desires | |
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| Boghossian's puzzle | |
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| What remains of privileged access? | |
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| Summary | |
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| Further reading | |
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| The acquaintance theory of self-knowledge | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Russell's acquaintance theory | |
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| Contemporary acquaintance theories | |
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| The acquaintance thesis | |
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| Davidson's challenge | |
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| Answering Davidson's challenge | |
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| Problems for acquaintance theories | |
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| The speckled hen | |
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| The problem of conceptualization | |
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| A proposed solution | |
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| Pruning the epistemic appearances | |
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| An account of phenomenal concepts amenable to acquaintance | |
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| Wittgenstein's "privacy" objection | |
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| Williamson's luminosity objection | |
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| The scope of the acquaintance theory | |
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| The acquaintance theory: costs and benefits | |
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| Summary | |
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| Further reading | |
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| The inner sense theory of self-knowledge | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Contemporary versions of the inner sense theory | |
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| Armstrong's version of the inner sense theory | |
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| Lycan's version of the inner sense theory | |
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| The objection from bruteness | |
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| The asymmetry objection | |
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| Shoemaker's objections | |
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| Self-blindness regarding pains | |
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| Self-blindness regarding beliefs: first argument | |
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| Self-blindness regarding beliefs: second argument | |
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| Defending the inner sense theory from Shoemaker's objections | |
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| Inner sense and the HOP theory of consciousness | |
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| A related view: Dretske's displaced perception account | |
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| The inner sense theory: costs and benefits | |
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| Summary | |
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| Further reading | |
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| The rationalist theory of self-knowledge | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Rationalism: Burge and Moran | |
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| Critical reasoning as a normative enterprise | |
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| Critical reasoning and self-knowledge | |
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| Reinterpreting the problem of self-knowledge | |
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| Is rationalism intended as an epistemic theory? | |
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| Objection: rationalism cannot explain the epistemic dimension of self-knowledge | |
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| Surge's epistemology of self-knowledge | |
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| Moran's epistemology of self-knowledge | |
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| The transparency method as an epistemic source | |
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| Related theories | |
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| Gallois' rationalism | |
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| Shoemaker's constitutivism | |
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| Neo-expressivism | |
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| The rationalist theory: costs and benefits | |
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| Summary | |
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| Further reading | |
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| Awareness of the self | |
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| Introduction | |
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| What is self-awareness? | |
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| Hume's thesis: the self is not introspectible | |
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| Awareness of oneself as a subject vs. as an object | |
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| Special features of self-awareness | |
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| Essential indexical | |
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| Immunity to error through misidentification | |
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| The introspective account | |
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| Introspective awareness of the self | |
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| The introspective account and Hume's bundle theory | |
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| Can the introspective account explain subject self-awareness? | |
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| The deflationary view | |
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| The situated subject account | |
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| The rational agency account | |
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| Sensory accounts | |
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| Evans's sensory account | |
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| Bermuda's sensory account | |
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| Do these accounts genuinely disagree? | |
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| Summary | |
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| Further reading | |
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| The dispute between empiricism and rationalism: a diagnosis | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The distinction between empiricism and rationalism | |
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| The rationalist's burden | |
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| Rationality and transparency | |
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| Two kinds of attitudes | |
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| The limits of transparency | |
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| Explaining transparency | |
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| Rationality and entitlement | |
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| The epistemic distinctiveness of critical self-knowledge | |
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| The rational agency account of self-awareness | |
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| Diagnosing the dispute between empiricism and rationalism | |
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| Summary | |
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| Further reading | |
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| Glossary | |
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| Notes | |
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| Bibliography | |
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| Index | |