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| List of Figures | |
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| List of Tables | |
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| Preface to the Second Edition | |
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| Preface | |
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| Modeling Negotiations | |
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| Overview and Level | |
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| Acknowledgments | |
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| Negotiations in the Bible | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Cain and Abel: Bargaining with God | |
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| Rahab and the Spies: Making a Just Agreement | |
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| Solomon's Arbitration: Discovering the Truth | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Notes | |
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| Bargaining Procedures and the Problem of Honesty | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Honesty Problem | |
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| The Bonus Procedure | |
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| The Bonus Appraisal Procedure | |
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| The Penalty Procedure | |
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| The Penalty Appraisal Procedure | |
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| The Expansive Appraisal Procedure | |
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| Camp David: The Logic of the Procedures Applied | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Notes | |
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| Arbitration Procedures and the Problem of Convergence | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Different Arbitration Procedures | |
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| Trade-Offs and Implicit Arbitration | |
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| Final-Offer Arbitration (FOA) | |
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| FOA in Practice: The Importance of Winning | |
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| Bonus FOA | |
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| Combined Arbitration | |
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| Two-Stage and Multistage FOA | |
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| Is Convergence in Stages Desirable? | |
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| Kissinger's Shuttle Diplomacy: A Case of Multistage Negotiations | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Notes | |
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| Superpower Crisis Bargaining and the Theory of Moves | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken | |
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| The Cuban Missile Crisis as a Game of Chicken | |
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| Deception and Power in the Cuban Missile Crisis | |
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| A Sequential View of the Cuban Missile Crisis | |
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| The 1973 Alert Decision | |
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| Nonmyopic Equilibria and the Theory of Moves: A Digression | |
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| Stability in the Cease-Fire Game | |
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| Was There an Alternative to the Alert? | |
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| The Possible Effects of Power in the Cease-Fire Game | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Notes | |
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| Threats and Reputation in Bargaining | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Repeated Play of a Sequential Game | |
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| Threat Outcomes in Repeated Play of a Game | |
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| The Sequential-Primary Game | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Notes | |
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| Threats in Two Domestic Crises | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Use of Threat Power in Poland, 1980-81 | |
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| The White House Tapes Case: The Players and Their Preferences | |
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| The White House Tapes Case: The Trap | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Notes | |
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| Bargaining in Legislatures | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Judgments about Vote Trading | |
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| Definitions and Assumptions about Vote Trading | |
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| Sincere and Insincere Voting | |
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| Initial Trades and the Paradox of Vote Trading | |
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| Subsequent Trades and the Instability of Vote Trading | |
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| The Consequences of Refusing to Trade | |
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| The Consequences of Forming Coalitions | |
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| Empirical Examples of the Paradox of Vote Trading | |
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| Choosing a Governing Coalition in a Multiparty System: Coalition Voting | |
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| Majority, Minimal Majority, and Governing Coalitions | |
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| Measuring Bargaining Strength under Coalition Voting | |
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| Possible Uses of Coalition Voting | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Notes | |
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| Bargaining Power | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Power in the U.S. Federal System | |
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| What Should a Power Index Measure? | |
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| The Power of Approval and Disapproval | |
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| Empirical Evidence of Presidential Power | |
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| The Paradox of the Chair's Position | |
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| The Chair's Counterstrategy of Deception | |
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| The Geneva Conference Game | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Notes | |
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| Epilogue | |
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| Glossary | |
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| Bibliography | |
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| Index | |