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Science of the Mind, Second Edition

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ISBN-10: 0262560569

ISBN-13: 9780262560566

Edition: 2nd 1991 (Revised)

Authors: Owen Flanagan

List price: $60.00
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Description:

Consciousness emerges as the key topic in this second edition of Owen Flanagan's popular introduction to cognitive science and the philosophy of psychology. in a new chapter Flanagan develops a neurophilosophical theory of subjective mental life. He brings recent developments in the theory of neuronal group selection and connectionism to bear on the problems of the evolution of consciousness, qualia, the unique first-personal aspects of consciousness, the causal role of consciousness, and the function and development of the sense of personal identity. He has also substantially revised the chapter on cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence to incorporate recent discussions of…    
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Book details

List price: $60.00
Edition: 2nd
Copyright year: 1991
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 3/5/1991
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 442
Size: 6.54" wide x 9.09" long x 0.96" tall
Weight: 1.540
Language: English

Owen Flanagan is James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy. His books include Varieties of Moral Personality (1991), Consciousness Reconsidered (1992), The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World (2007), and The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized (2011).

Acknowledgments
Preface to the Second Edition
Introduction
Minds and Bodies: Rene Descartes and the Possibility of a Science of the Mind
Descartes' Philosophy of the Body: The Reflex Hypothesis
Descartes' Philosophy of Mind: Three Arguments for Dualism
Conclusion
Suggested Readings
Primary Sources
Three Excellent Studies on Descartes
The Most Recent Contemporary Defense of Dualism
Naturalizing The Mind: The Philosophical Psychology of William James
William James: Mentality and Introspection
Toward a Theory of Conscious Mental Life
What Is CML Like?
What Is CML for?
Mind and Brain: How Is Conscious Mental Life Realized?
Naturalism and Free Will
Conclusion
Suggested Readings
General Primary Sources
On Free Will
On Consciousness
On Intentionality
On Introspection
Four Good Commentaries
Philosophical Implications of Pragmatism
Science and the Secret Self: The Case of Sigmund Freud
Freud on the Mind-Body Problem and Psychological Explanation
Psychoanalysis and Self-Knowledge
Is Psychoanalysis Scientific?
Conclusion
Suggested Readings
Two Best Primary Sources for an Overview of Freud's Thought
Collected Works
Three Important Intellectual Biographies
On the Scientific Status of Psychoanalysis
General Philosophical Essays on Freud
The Science of Behavior, Antimentalism, and the Good Life: The Philosophical Psychology of...
Skinner's Critique of Two Kinds of Mentalism
The Theoretician's Dilemma
Skinner on Self-Knowledge
The Concept of the "Operant": Selection by Consequences
Psychology and the Good Life
Conclusion
Suggested Readings
General Introductions
Central Philosophical Works
Psychology and Political Philosophy
Important Criticisms
Philosophical Foundations
Philosophical Work in the Behaviorist Mold
The Case for Cognitive-Developmental Psychology: Piaget and Kohlberg
Cognitive Development, Empiricism, and Nativism
Stages and Structures
Assimilation, Accommodation, and Autoregulation
The Constructivist's Fallacy
Piaget's Adequacy Thesis
Conclusion
Lawrence Kohlberg: Duties, Dilemmas, and Moral Stages
The Bad Experimental Paradigm Objection
The Failure to Satisfy Piaget's Stage Criteria Objection
Kohlberg's Adequacy Thesis
Conclusion
Suggested Readings by and about Piaget
General Overview
Criticisms of Piaget's Theory
Suggested Reading by and about Kohlberg
Collected Papers
Major Philosophical Essays
Criticisms of Kohlberg's Theory
Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence: Philosophical Assumptions and Implications
Cognitive Science: The Basic Program
Kant, Cognitive Science, and the Anticipation of Experience
Transcendental Reasoning: Two Experiments
Sternberg on Symbolic Memory
Shepard and Metzler on Imagistic Representation
Cognitive Science and Self-Knowledge
Cognitive Science and the Unity of Mind
Massachusetts Modularism
Split-Brain Research
Cognitive Science and Rationality
Cognitive Science and the Mind-Brain Problem
Cognitive Science and the Charms of Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence
Parallel Distributed Processing, Connectionism, and Biological Realism
The Mine-Rock Detector
NETtalk
Four Kinds of Artificial Intelligence
Nonpsychological AI
Weak Psychological AI
Strong Psychological AI
Suprapsychological AI
Ten Objections to Artificial Intelligence
The Informality Objection
The No Originality Objection
The Reductionism Objection
The Realism Objection
The Frame Problem
The No Emotions Objection
The No Intrinsic Intentionality Objection
The No Consciousness Objection
The No Point of View Objection
The No Free Will Objection
Conclusion
Suggested Readings
General Introductions to Cognitive Science and AI
Philosophical Foundations
Identity Theory
Functionalism
Eliminativism
Rationality and Self-Knowledge
Unity of Mind
Important Attacks on AI
Minds, Genes, and Morals: The Case of E. O. Wilson's Sociobiology
The Conceptual Foundations of Sociobiology
Phenotypic Variation
Differential Darwinian Fitness
Hereditability of Fitness
Closing the Genotype-Phenotype Gap: The Opening Gambit
Strategy 3: The Argument from Adaptation
Closing the Genotype-Phenotype Gap: The New Argument
Sociobiology and Morality
The Principle of Concern for the Future of the Gene Pool
The Principle of Genetic Diversity
The Principle of Universal Human Rights
Conclusion
Suggested Readings
Conceptual Foundations
Important Philosophical Criticisms and Commentaries
Consciousness
Cognitivism and Consciousness
Conscious Shyness and the "New Mysterians"
Mind, Brain, and Experience
The Evolution of Darwin Machines
Neural Darwinism
Self and Nonself
Sensory Qualia and Neural Vectors
Experiential Sensitivity versus Informational Sensitivity
Identity Theory to a First Approximation?
The New Mysterians' Response
A Critique of the New Mysterians' Argument
Conscious Inessentialism, Absent Qualia, and the Epiphenomenalist Suspicion
Teleological Functionalism
The Self as the Center of Narrative Gravity
A Unified Theory of Consciousness?
Conclusion
Suggested Readings
The Best Recent Collection of Work on Consciousness
Functionalist-Computational Theories of Consciousness
Neurophilosophical Theories of Consciousness
The Self, Self-Consciousness, and Multiple Selves
The New Mysterians
Notes
Bibliography
Name Index
Subject Index