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Preface | |
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Introduction | |
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The Theory of Trade Agreements | |
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The Purpose of Trade Agreements | |
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The General Equilibrium Model | |
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The Traditional Economic Approach | |
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The Political-Economy Approach | |
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The Commitment Approach | |
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Comparison of Approaches | |
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Rules versus Power | |
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Enforcement | |
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The History and Design of GATT and the WTO | |
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The Origin of GATT and the WTO | |
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The Rules of GATT | |
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Substantive Obligations | |
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Exceptions | |
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Dispute Settlement Procedures | |
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Reciprocity, Nondiscrimination, and Enforcement under GATT | |
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Reciprocity | |
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Reciprocity in GATT | |
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Reciprocity and Trade Negotiations | |
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Reciprocity and Renegotiation | |
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Reciprocity and Participation: Rules versus Power | |
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MFN | |
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MFN in GATT | |
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The Multicountry Model | |
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The General Equilibrium Model | |
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Government Preferences | |
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MFN, Reciprocity, and Trade Negotiations | |
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Significance | |
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MFN and Reciprocity | |
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Nonviolation Nullification-or-Impairment Complaints | |
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The Free-Rider Problem | |
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MFN, Reciprocity and Renegotiation | |
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MFN and the Terms-of-Trade Theory: A Summary | |
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MFN and Political Externalities | |
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Enforcement | |
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GATT Enforcement and the Theory of Repeated Games | |
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Predictions | |
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Rebalancing the Agreement: The GATT Escape Clause | |
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Gradualism: Rounds of Trade Liberalization | |
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The Exchange and Aggregation of Enforcement Power | |
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Preferential Trading Agreements | |
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Preferential Trading Agreements in GATT | |
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Preferential Trading Agreements and Reciprocity | |
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PTAs and Trade Negotiations | |
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PTAs and Renegotiation | |
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Preferential Trading Agreements and Multilateral Enforcement | |
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Other Approaches | |
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Labor and Environmental Standards | |
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Labor and Environmental Standards in GATT | |
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The Model with Domestic Standards | |
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The General Equilibrium Model | |
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Government Preferences | |
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The Purpose of a Trade Agreement | |
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Efficient Policies | |
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Noncooperative Policies | |
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Identifying the Inefficiency | |
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Trade Agreements and National Sovereignty | |
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Enforcement of Labor and Environmental Standards | |
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Competition Policy | |
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Competition Policy in GATT | |
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The Model with Competition Policy | |
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The General Equilibrium Model | |
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Government Preferences | |
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The Purpose of a Trade Agreement | |
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Trade Agreements and National Sovereignty | |
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Agricultural Export Subsidies | |
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Agricultural Export Subsidies in GATT | |
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Features of the Agricultural Disputes | |
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Theoretical Approaches | |
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The Model of Agricultural Export Subsidies | |
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The Partial Equilibrium Model | |
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Government Preferences | |
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The Purpose of Subsidy Agreements | |
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Nash Subsidies | |
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Cooperative Subsidies | |
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Efficient Subsidies | |
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Illustration | |
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Interpretation | |
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The Treatment of Export Subsidies | |
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The Practical Relevance of Terms-of-Trade Considerations | |
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Conclusion | |
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Appendixes | |
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Appendix to Chapter 2 | |
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Appendix to Chapter 5 | |
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The General Equilibrium Model: Further Details | |
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The Efficiency Frontier: Characterizations | |
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Many Goods | |
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References | |
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Index | |