| |
| |
Acknowledgments | |
| |
| |
Sources | |
| |
| |
Introduction | |
| |
| |
| |
Summary of This Volume | |
| |
| |
| |
Visual Experience: Some Distinctions | |
| |
| |
| |
Red-Representing Experiences and Red-Feeling Experiences | |
| |
| |
| |
Phenomenal Properties | |
| |
| |
| |
Sensational Properties | |
| |
| |
| |
Three Kinds of Experiential Property | |
| |
| |
| |
Eliminativism | |
| |
| |
| |
Dispositionalism | |
| |
| |
| |
Physicalism | |
| |
| |
| |
Primitivism | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
References | |
| |
| |
On Some Criticisms of a Physicalist Theory of Colors | |
| |
| |
Acknowledgments | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
Color and the Anthropocentric Problem | |
| |
| |
| |
The Trilemma | |
| |
| |
| |
Smart's Account of Color | |
| |
| |
| |
A Natural-Kind Account of Color | |
| |
| |
| |
Problems with the A-All Account of Part II | |
| |
| |
| |
Another Nonanthropocentric Account of Color | |
| |
| |
Acknowledgments | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
Smart and the Secondary Qualities | |
| |
| |
The Development of Smart's View | |
| |
| |
Defence of an Objectivist Physicalism About the Secondary Qualities | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
Reply to Armstrong | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
Colour Concepts and Colour Experience | |
| |
| |
Acknowledgements | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
An Objectivist's Guide To Subjectivism About Colour | |
| |
| |
| |
Colour Terms | |
| |
| |
| |
The Dispositional Truism | |
| |
| |
| |
Subjectivism About Colour | |
| |
| |
| |
An Empirical Complication | |
| |
| |
| |
Colours, Shapes, and Causal Interaction Patterns | |
| |
| |
| |
Colours in the Dark and in Other Worlds | |
| |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
Acknowledgments | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
Colour as a Secondary Quality | |
| |
| |
The Galilean Intuition | |
| |
| |
Charitable Accounts of Colour Experience | |
| |
| |
The Physicalist Account | |
| |
| |
Dispositionalist Accounts | |
| |
| |
The Projectivist Account | |
| |
| |
Pros and Cons | |
| |
| |
Interpreting Colour Discourse | |
| |
| |
Acknowledgments | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
Physicalist Theories of Color | |
| |
| |
The Problem of Color Realism | |
| |
| |
Metaphysics and Semantics | |
| |
| |
What is Looking Colored? | |
| |
| |
Color Experience vs. Color Discourse | |
| |
| |
Versions of Physicalism | |
| |
| |
The Naive Objection | |
| |
| |
Colors vs. Ways of Being Colored | |
| |
| |
The Propositional Content of Visual Experience | |
| |
| |
Further Distinctions | |
| |
| |
The First Intuition: Similarity Classes | |
| |
| |
A Humean Proposal | |
| |
| |
An Information-Theoretic Proposal | |
| |
| |
Introducing Qualia | |
| |
| |
The Second Intuition: Causes of Visual Effects | |
| |
| |
Outline of the Argument | |
| |
| |
Epistemological Constraints | |
| |
| |
Meeting the Epistemological Constraints | |
| |
| |
Some Defenses and Replies | |
| |
| |
Smart's Analogy | |
| |
| |
Armstrong's Analogy | |
| |
| |
Explaining the Epistemological Intuitions Away | |
| |
| |
Fregean, Realization-Theoretic Theories | |
| |
| |
A New Proposal | |
| |
| |
The Initial Fregean, Realization-Theoretic Proposal | |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
Acknowledgements | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
How to Speak of the Colors | |
| |
| |
Color Concepts as Cluster Concepts | |
| |
| |
Are Color Concepts Primary or Secondary? | |
| |
| |
The (Possibly Vacuous) Case of the Bare Disposition | |
| |
| |
The Case of the Constituted Disposition | |
| |
| |
Explanation | |
| |
| |
Unity and Availability | |
| |
| |
Which Response-Dispositional Concepts are the Color Concepts? | |
| |
| |
Rigidification | |
| |
| |
Standard Mediation | |
| |
| |
Relativized Colors | |
| |
| |
Kripke's Reference-Fixing Account | |
| |
| |
Revelation Revisited | |
| |
| |
Acknowledgments | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
Postscript: Visual Experience | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
A Simple View of Colour | |
| |
| |
Acknowledgments | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
The Autonomy of Colour | |
| |
| |
| |
Are Colours Explanatorily Idle? | |
| |
| |
| |
Colour Laws and Colour Science | |
| |
| |
| |
Colour Interpretation | |
| |
| |
| |
Away from the Dispositional Thesis | |
| |
| |
| |
Colour Interpretation | |
| |
| |
| |
The Colour of a Surface as a Way in Which it Changes the Light | |
| |
| |
Acknowledgments | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
Phenomenal Character | |
| |
| |
Acknowledgments | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
References | |
| |
| |
Explaining Objective Color in Terms of Subjective Reactions | |
| |
| |
| |
Why Objective Color Should Be Explained in Terms of Subjective Reactions | |
| |
| |
| |
Color Sensations | |
| |
| |
| |
Objective Color Explained in Terms of Color Sensations | |
| |
| |
| |
Color Sensations as Basic | |
| |
| |
| |
Variations in Color Sensations | |
| |
| |
| |
Functional Definitions of Color Sensations | |
| |
| |
| |
Complication: There Are No Color Sensations | |
| |
| |
| |
Representational Character of Perceptual Experience | |
| |
| |
| |
The Concept of Color | |
| |
| |
| |
The Inverted Spectrum | |
| |
| |
| |
Worries About Inverted Spectra | |
| |
| |
| |
What Is It Like to See Red? | |
| |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
References | |
| |
| |
Colors and Reflectances | |
| |
| |
| |
Introduction | |
| |
| |
| |
Green-Representing and Green-Feeling Experiences | |
| |
| |
| |
A Physicalist Theory of Color | |
| |
| |
| |
Colors Are Reflectances | |
| |
| |
| |
Content and Phenomenology | |
| |
| |
| |
Replies to Objections | |
| |
| |
| |
First Objection: Actual Variations in Phenomenology | |
| |
| |
| |
Second Objection: Red Is Really More Similar to Orange than It Is to Green | |
| |
| |
| |
Third Objection: Physicalism Cannot Account for Binary Structure | |
| |
| |
| |
Conclusion: The Case for Physicalism | |
| |
| |
Acknowledgments | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
References | |
| |
| |
Reinverting the Spectrum | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
References | |
| |
| |
Bibliography | |
| |
| |
Contributors | |
| |
| |
Index | |