Skip to content

Philosophy of Color

ISBN-10: 0262522306

ISBN-13: 9780262522304

Edition: 1997

Authors: Alex Byrne, David R. Hilbert

List price: $42.00
Blue ribbon 30 day, 100% satisfaction guarantee!
what's this?
Rush Rewards U
Members Receive:
Carrot Coin icon
XP icon
You have reached 400 XP and carrot coins. That is the daily max!

Description:

Colour is an endlessly fascinating subject, as well as an instructive microcosm of cognitive science. This volume provides a philosophical background, and links the philosophical issues to the empirical work covered in volume 2.
Customers also bought

Book details

List price: $42.00
Copyright year: 1997
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 5/15/1997
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 346
Size: 7.25" wide x 9.25" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 1.430
Language: English

Acknowledgments
Sources
Introduction
Summary of This Volume
Visual Experience: Some Distinctions
Red-Representing Experiences and Red-Feeling Experiences
Phenomenal Properties
Sensational Properties
Three Kinds of Experiential Property
Eliminativism
Dispositionalism
Physicalism
Primitivism
Notes
References
On Some Criticisms of a Physicalist Theory of Colors
Acknowledgments
Notes
Color and the Anthropocentric Problem
The Trilemma
Smart's Account of Color
A Natural-Kind Account of Color
Problems with the A-All Account of Part II
Another Nonanthropocentric Account of Color
Acknowledgments
Notes
Smart and the Secondary Qualities
The Development of Smart's View
Defence of an Objectivist Physicalism About the Secondary Qualities
Notes
Reply to Armstrong
Notes
Colour Concepts and Colour Experience
Acknowledgements
Notes
An Objectivist's Guide To Subjectivism About Colour
Colour Terms
The Dispositional Truism
Subjectivism About Colour
An Empirical Complication
Colours, Shapes, and Causal Interaction Patterns
Colours in the Dark and in Other Worlds
Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Notes
Colour as a Secondary Quality
The Galilean Intuition
Charitable Accounts of Colour Experience
The Physicalist Account
Dispositionalist Accounts
The Projectivist Account
Pros and Cons
Interpreting Colour Discourse
Acknowledgments
Notes
Physicalist Theories of Color
The Problem of Color Realism
Metaphysics and Semantics
What is Looking Colored?
Color Experience vs. Color Discourse
Versions of Physicalism
The Naive Objection
Colors vs. Ways of Being Colored
The Propositional Content of Visual Experience
Further Distinctions
The First Intuition: Similarity Classes
A Humean Proposal
An Information-Theoretic Proposal
Introducing Qualia
The Second Intuition: Causes of Visual Effects
Outline of the Argument
Epistemological Constraints
Meeting the Epistemological Constraints
Some Defenses and Replies
Smart's Analogy
Armstrong's Analogy
Explaining the Epistemological Intuitions Away
Fregean, Realization-Theoretic Theories
A New Proposal
The Initial Fregean, Realization-Theoretic Proposal
Conclusion
Acknowledgements
Notes
How to Speak of the Colors
Color Concepts as Cluster Concepts
Are Color Concepts Primary or Secondary?
The (Possibly Vacuous) Case of the Bare Disposition
The Case of the Constituted Disposition
Explanation
Unity and Availability
Which Response-Dispositional Concepts are the Color Concepts?
Rigidification
Standard Mediation
Relativized Colors
Kripke's Reference-Fixing Account
Revelation Revisited
Acknowledgments
Notes
Postscript: Visual Experience
Notes
A Simple View of Colour
Acknowledgments
Notes
The Autonomy of Colour
Are Colours Explanatorily Idle?
Colour Laws and Colour Science
Colour Interpretation
Away from the Dispositional Thesis
Colour Interpretation
The Colour of a Surface as a Way in Which it Changes the Light
Acknowledgments
Notes
Phenomenal Character
Acknowledgments
Notes
References
Explaining Objective Color in Terms of Subjective Reactions
Why Objective Color Should Be Explained in Terms of Subjective Reactions
Color Sensations
Objective Color Explained in Terms of Color Sensations
Color Sensations as Basic
Variations in Color Sensations
Functional Definitions of Color Sensations
Complication: There Are No Color Sensations
Representational Character of Perceptual Experience
The Concept of Color
The Inverted Spectrum
Worries About Inverted Spectra
What Is It Like to See Red?
Conclusion
Notes
References
Colors and Reflectances
Introduction
Green-Representing and Green-Feeling Experiences
A Physicalist Theory of Color
Colors Are Reflectances
Content and Phenomenology
Replies to Objections
First Objection: Actual Variations in Phenomenology
Second Objection: Red Is Really More Similar to Orange than It Is to Green
Third Objection: Physicalism Cannot Account for Binary Structure
Conclusion: The Case for Physicalism
Acknowledgments
Notes
References
Reinverting the Spectrum
Notes
References
Bibliography
Contributors
Index