Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games

Name: Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games
Price: 9.38 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780262033053

ISBN-10: 0262033054

ISBN-13: 9780262033053

Edition: 2003

Authors: Ross Cressman, Christopher Ansell, Ken Binmore

List price: $10.75

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Description:

Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games are specified more naturally through their extensive forms. Because every extensive form game has a normal form representation, some theorists hold that the best way to analyze an extensive form game is simply to ignore the extensive form structure and study the game in its normal form representation. This book rejects that suggestion, arguing that a game's normal form representation often omits…

Book details

List price: $10.75
Copyright year: 2003
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 6/6/2003
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 320
Size: 6.50" wide x 9.50" long x 1.00" tall
Weight: 1.298
Language: English

Ross Cressman is Professor of Mathematics at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada.

Christopher Ansell is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley.



Series Foreword


Preface



Introduction



Extensive Form versus Normal Form



Biology versus Economics



Imitation



Organizational Matters



Notes



Symmetric Normal Form Games



The Replicator Dynamic



Dynamics for Two-Strategy Games



Monotone Selection Dynamics



Fictitious Play and Best Response Dynamic



Convergence and Stability: NE and ESS



Three-Strategy Game Dynamics



Dynamic Stability for General Games



Natural Selection at a Single Locus



One-Stage Simultaneity Games



Multi-armed Bandits



Appendix



Notes