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Political Liberalism

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ISBN-10: 0231130880

ISBN-13: 9780231130882

Edition: 2nd 2005 (Enlarged)

Authors: John Rawls, John Rawls

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This text continues and revises the ideas of justice as fairness that John Rawls presented in 'A Theory of Justice' but changes its philosophical interpretation in a fundamental way.
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Book details

Edition: 2nd
Copyright year: 2005
Publisher: Columbia University Press
Publication date: 3/24/2005
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 576
Size: 6.50" wide x 8.50" long x 1.50" tall
Weight: 1.958

John Rawls, professor of philosophy at Harvard University, had published a number of articles on the concept of justice as fairness before the appearance of his magnum opus, A Theory of Justice (1971). While the articles had won for Rawls considerable prestige, the reception of his book thrust him into the front ranks of contemporary moral philosophy. Presenting a Kantian alternative to conventional utilitarianism and intuitionism, Rawls offers a theory of justice that is contractual and that rests on principles that he alleges would be accepted by free, rational persons in a state of nature, that is, of equality. The chorus of praise was loud and clear. Stuart Hampshire acclaimed the book…    

Introduction to the Paperback Edition
Political Liberalism: Basic Elements
Fundamental Ideas Addressing Two Fundamental Questions
The Idea of a Political Conception of Justice
The Idea of Society as a Fair System of Cooperation
The Idea of the Original Position
The Political Conception of the Person
The Idea of a Well-Ordered Society Neither a Community nor an Association
The Use of Abstract Conceptions
The Powers of Citizens and Their Representation
The Reasonable and the Rational
The Burdens of Judgement Reasonable Comprehensive Doctrines
The Publicity Condition: Its Three Levels Rational Autonomy: Artificial not Political Full Autonomy: Political not Ethical
The Basis of Motivation in the Person Moral Psychology: Philosophical not Psychological
Political Constructivism
The Idea of a Constructivist Conception Kant's Moral Constructivism Justice as Fairness as a Constructivist View
The Role of Conceptions of Society and Person
Three Conceptions of Objectivity Objectivity Independent of the Casual View of Knowledge
When Do Objective Reasons Exist, Politically Speaking?
The Scope of Political Constructivism
Political Liberalism: Three Main Ideas
The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus
How is Political Liberalism Possible?
The Question of Stability Three Features of an Overlapping Consensus An Overlapping Consensus not Indifferent or Skeptical
A Political Conception Need Not Be Comprehensive Steps to Constitutional Consensus
Steps to Overlapping Consensus Conception and Doctrines: How Related
Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good
How a Political Conception Limits Conceptions of the Good Goodness as Rationality
Primary Goods and Interpersonal Comparisons Primary Goods as Citizens'
Need Permissible Conceptions of the Good and Political Virtues Is Justice as Fairness Fair to Conceptions of the Good?
The Good of Political Society
That Justice as Fairness is Complete
The Idea of Public Reason
The Question and Forums of Public Right Public Reason and the Ideal of Democratic Citizenship Nonpublic Reasons
The Content of Public Reason
The Ideal of Constitutional Essentials
The Supreme Court as Exemplar of Public Reason Apparent Difficulties with Public Reason
The Limits of Public Reason
Institutional Framework
The Basic Structure as Subject
First Subject of Justice Unity by Appropriate Sequence Libertarianism
Has No Special Role for the Basic Structure
The Importance of Background Justice
How the Basic Structure Affects Individuals Initial Agreement as Hypothetical and Nonhistorical
Special Features of the Initial Agreement
The Social Nature of Human Relationships Ideal Form for the Basic Structure
Reply to Hegel's Criticism
The Basic Liberties and Their Priority
The Initial Aim of Justice as Fairness
The Special Status of Basic Liberties Conceptions of Person and Social Cooperation
The Original Position Priority of Liberties, I: Second Moral Power Priority of Liberties, II: First Moral Power Basic
Liberties not Merely Formal
A Fully Adequate Scheme of Basic Liberties
How Liberties Fit into One Coherent Scheme Free Political Speech
The Clear and Present Danger Rule Maintaining the Fair Value of Political
Liberties Liberties Connected with the Second Principle
The Role of Justice as Fairness
Reply to Habermas
Two Main Differences Overlapping Consensus and Justification
Liberties of the Moderns Versus the Will of the People
The Roots of the Liberties Procedural Versus Substantive Justice