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Chinese State Enterprises A Regional Property Rights Analysis

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ISBN-10: 0226305880

ISBN-13: 9780226305882

Edition: 1990

Authors: David Granick

List price: $94.00
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Description:

"We are indebted to David Granick for his thoughtful, careful, empirically documented study of the Chinese state industrial enterprise that not only provides a rarely attained comparative analysis but also possesses an explanatory power in suggesting how this system might evolve in the future."--Jeanne L. Wilson, Business Horizons
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Book details

List price: $94.00
Copyright year: 1990
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication date: 3/22/1990
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 358
Size: 0.02" wide x 0.04" long x 0.00" tall
Weight: 1.562
Language: English

Tables
Acknowledgments
Introduction
The Set of Case Studies
Coverage of the Book and Organization
The Targeted Readership
Multiple Principals in Principal-Agent
Analysis Analytic Framework
Facts To Be Explained
The Property Rights Model and the Basic Hypothesis
History of Property Rights
Over State-owned Enterprises
Principal-Agent Analysis Applied to Supervision Over Enterprises
Property Rights in General in the People's Republic of China Hierarchy Among Principals
Appendix: Case Studies of Supervisory Authority Over Enterprises
Planning As Coordination
The Macroeconomic Setting Plan Fulfillment by the Individual Enterprise
The Ratchet Effect Syndrome
Hypothesis As To Planning Analysis of Sample Data
Conclusion
Appendix: Planning Materials on Individual Enterprises
Multiple Prices and Equilibrium
Price Stage Analysis of Industrial Procurement
Procurement Data From the Sample
Multiple Prices and Equilibrium Analysis
Kornai's "Soft Budget Constraint"
The Incentives Facing the Enterprises
Incentives Specific to Upper Managers
Incentives Common to the Labor
Force As a Whole
Conclusion
Appendix: Regressions for Incentives Common to the Labor Force As a Whole
Elements of Price
Sales Tax and Profits
Materials Purchases and Wages
Conclusions
Internal Organization of the Enterprise
Party Committee versus Director Control Within the Enterprise Trade
Unions, Workers' Congresses, and Democratic Management
Foremen and Political Cadres
Conclusion, Including Evaluations of Efficiency
Thematic Summary
Allocation of Labor and Determination of Wages
The Pre-reform and Reform Years: Differences and Continuities
Efficiency Evaluations
Appendix: The Chinese Incentive System in State Industry
Notes
References
Index