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Handbook of Market Design

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ISBN-10: 0199570515

ISBN-13: 9780199570515

Edition: 2013

Authors: Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, Zvika Neeman

List price: $110.00
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Book details

List price: $110.00
Copyright year: 2013
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Publication date: 8/29/2013
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 720
Size: 7.09" wide x 9.96" long x 1.73" tall
Weight: 3.058
Language: English

List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Contributors
Introduction
General Principles
What Have We Learned From Market Design?
Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior
Using and Abusing Auction Theory
Cases
Matching Markets
Market Design for Kidney Exchange
School Choice
Improving Efficiency in School Choice
Can the Job Market for Economists Be Improved?
Designing Markets for Ideas
Redesigning Microcredit
Auctions
The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods
Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions
Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati Diamonds
E-Commerce
Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior
Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents
The Design of Online Advertising Markets
Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting $60 Billion of Sourcing
Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwidth
Law Design
A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems
Legislation with Endogenous Preferences
Experiments
Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled-Assets Reverse Auction
Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment
Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions
The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill
Competing Designs
Competing Mechanisms
Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets
Index
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