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Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy

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ISBN-10: 0199261687

ISBN-13: 9780199261680

Edition: 2003

Authors: Russell Hardin

List price: $65.00
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In his ground-breaking book, the leading political philosopher Russell Hardin develops a new theory of liberal constitutional democracy. Arguing against the standard consensus theories, the author shows how social co-ordination on limited, sociological mutual advantage lies at the heart of liberal constitutionalism when it works to produce stable government.The book argues that liberalism, constitutionalism, and democracy are co-ordination theories. They work only in societies in which co-ordination of the important power groups for mutual advantage is feasible. It then goes on to examine and interpret the US constitution as motivated centrally by the concern with creating a government to…    
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Book details

List price: $65.00
Copyright year: 2003
Publisher: Oxford University Press, Incorporated
Publication date: 8/14/2003
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 400
Size: 5.50" wide x 8.50" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 1.100
Language: English

Mutual Advantage
Three Mutual-Advantage Theories
Social Order
Political Obligation
Unintended Consequences
The Governors
The Argument of the Book
The Normative Status of Sociological Mutual Advantage
A Summary of the Chapters
The Central Controversies
Liberalism: Political and Economic
Two Liberalisms
The Grounds of Liberalism
The Welfarist Core
Deontological Additions
Strategic Structures
The Complex View
Collective Resolution
Causal and Conceptual Links
One Unified Liberalism?
Religious Toleration Again
Historical Changes
Centralized Intelligence
Concluding Remarks
Constitutionalism: Contract or Coordination?
Institutions and Choice
Contract or Coordination?
The Strategic Structure of a Constitution
Coordination on and under a Constitution
Agreement and a Constitution
Incentives to Abide by a Constitution
Contracts Not Like Contracts Either
Bargains in Philadelphia
Large versus Small States
Anti-Federalists versus Federalists
Plantation Agrarian versus Commercial Interests
Ex Ante Justification
Why a Written Constitution?
Democracy: Agreement or Acquiescence?
Popular Sovereignty
Constitutionalism and Democracy
Justice as Order and Democracy
Government as Grown
The Logic of Democracy
Limits on Citizen Responsibility
Individual Autonomy
The Right Result
Alternative Visions
Virtual Representation
Concluding Remarks
Liberalization and its Discontents
Transition to the Two Liberalisms
Constitutional Liberalism
Ethnic Conflicts
Economic Conflicts
Equality versus Efficiency
Egalitarianism in One Society
Egalitarianism Without Socialism
The Dual Task of 1989
Irreversibility of Liberalization?
Political Liberalization
Economic Liberalization
Concluding Remarks
Constitutional Economic Transition
A Neutral Constitution
Expectations and Constitutional Stability
Economic and Political Visions in the Early United States
The Commerce Clause
Economic Growth, Economic Transition
Hammer and Sickle
Economic Transition in a Constitutional Democracy
Economic Transition and Demographic Growth
American and Eastern Comparisons
Concluding Remarks
Democracy on the Margin
Divided Society
Democracy as Group Census
Interests and Democracy
Constitutional Pre-commitment
American Extremes
Democracy and Economic Development
Communal Good
Group Justice and Democracy
Unequal Coordination
Concluding Remarks
Afterword: Whether Agreed to or Not
Justifying the Whole
Collective and Individual Values
Acquiescence and Mutual Advantage
Concluding Remarks
Other Liberalisms
Social Liberalism
Institutional Liberalism
Welfare Liberalism
Group Liberalism
The Civil Rights Movement
Strategic Differences