Rejection of Consequentialism A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions
Edition: 2nd 1994 (Revised)
List price: $39.95
Buy it from $10.94
This item qualifies for FREE shipping
*A minimum purchase of $35 is required. Shipping is provided via FedEx SmartPost® and FedEx Express Saver®. Average delivery time is 1 – 5 business days, but is not guaranteed in that timeframe. Also allow 1 - 2 days for processing. Free shipping is eligible only in the continental United States and excludes Hawaii, Alaska and Puerto Rico. FedEx service marks used by permission."Marketplace" orders are not eligible for free or discounted shipping.
30 day, 100% satisfaction guarantee
If an item you ordered from TextbookRush does not meet your expectations due to an error on our part, simply fill out a return request and then return it by mail within 30 days of ordering it for a full refund of item cost.
Learn more about our returns policy
Description: In contemporary philosophy, substantive moral theories are typically classified as either consequentialist or deontological. Standard consequentialist theories insist, roughly, that agents must always act so as to produce the best available outcomes overall. Standard deontological theories, by contrast, maintain that there are some circumstances where one is permitted but not required to produce the best overall results, and still other circumstances in which one is positively forbidden to do so. Classical utilitarianism is the most familiar consequentialist view, but it is widely regarded as an inadequate account of morality. Although Samuel Scheffler agrees with this assessment, he also believes that consequentialism seems initially plausible, and that there is a persistent air of paradox surrounding typical deontological views. In this book, therefore, he undertakes to reconsider the rejection of consequentialism. He argues that it is possible to provide a rationale for the view that agents need not always produce the best possible overall outcomes, and this motivates one departure from consequentialism; but he shows that it is surprisingly difficult to provide a satisfactory rationale for the view that there are times when agents must not produce the best possible overall outcomes. He goes on to argue for a hitherto neglected type of moral conception, according to which agents are always permitted, but not always required, to produce the best outcomes.
Rush Rewards U
You have reached 400 XP and carrot coins. That is the daily max!
Limited time offer:
Get the first one free!
All the information you need in one place! Each Study Brief is a summary of one specific subject; facts, figures, and explanations to help you learn faster.
List price: $39.95
Copyright year: 1994
Publisher: Oxford University Press, Incorporated
Publication date: 9/22/1994
Size: 5.50" wide x 8.50" long x 0.75" tall
|the Rejection Of Consequentialism|
|The Project and Its Motivation|
|Outline of a New Theory of Normative Ethics|
|The Independence and Distinctness of the Personal Point of View|
|The Defence of Agent-Centred Restrictions: Intuitions in Search of a Foundation|
|The Project Reconsidered|