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| The Study of Top Executives | |
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| The Essence of Strategic Leadership | |
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| Academic Attention to Executives: A Historical View | |
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| The Scope of Strategic Leadership | |
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| Chief Executive Officers | |
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| Business Unit Heads | |
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| Top Management Teams | |
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| Boards of Directors | |
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| Additional Matters of Scope | |
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| Overview of the Book | |
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| Do Top Executives Matter? | |
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| What Do Top Executives Do? | |
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| Basic Dimensions of the Job | |
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| Do Managers Matter? A Doubtful View | |
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| Do Managers Matter? A Positive View | |
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| Problems with Lieberson and O'Connor's Study | |
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| Evidence of Executive Effects | |
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| Managerial Discretion | |
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| Environmental Sources | |
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| Organizational Sources | |
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| Individual Sources | |
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| Effects of Discretion | |
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| Executive Job Demands | |
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| The Managerial Mystique | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| How Individual Differences Affect Executive Action | |
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| A Model of Human Limits on Strategic Choice | |
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| The Filtering Process | |
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| Executive Orientation: An Overview | |
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| Psychological Characteristics as Bases for Executive Action | |
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| Executive Values | |
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| Cognitive Model | |
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| Executive Personality | |
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| Positive Self-Regard | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Executive Experiences and Organizational Outcomes | |
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| Executive Tenure | |
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| Tenure and Executive Psychology | |
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| Tenure and Organizational Strategy | |
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| Tenure and Performance | |
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| Functional Background | |
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| Functional Experiences and Executive Perceptions | |
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| Links to Strategy and Performance | |
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| Future Research on Functional Experiences | |
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| Formal Education | |
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| International Experience | |
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| Future Directions | |
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| Promising Avenues of Research | |
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| A Still-Untapped Perspective: The Factors Affecting the Predictive Strength of Executive Characteristics | |
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| Which Traits? | |
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| Which Behaviors? | |
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| Which People? | |
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| Which Situations? | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Top Management Teams | |
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| The Conceptual Elements of Top Management Teams | |
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| How the Conceptual Elements of TMTs Are Related | |
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| Teams versus Groups | |
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| Who Is in the Top Group? | |
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| Power Dynamics at the Top | |
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| Interactions within TMTs | |
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| The CEO and Team Process | |
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| Determinants of TMT Characteristics | |
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| Environment | |
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| Organization | |
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| CEO | |
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| Consequences of TMTs' Interaction | |
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| Consequences of TMTs on Strategic Decision Making | |
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| Consequences of TMTs on Strategy | |
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| Consequences of TMTs on Firm Performance | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Changes at the Top: The Antecedents of Executive Turnover and Succession | |
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| Will Succession Occur? Determinants of Top Executive Departure | |
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| Organizational Performance | |
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| Agency Conditions | |
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| Other Organizational Characteristics | |
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| Environment | |
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| Predecessor (Incumbent) Characteristics | |
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| What Will Be the Dynamics of the Succession Process? | |
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| Types of Successions | |
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| Influence of the Incumbent versus the Board | |
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| Who Will Be Selected? | |
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| Insider versus Outsider Selection | |
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| The Broader Case of Continuity versus Change | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Changes at the Top: The Consequences of Executive Turnover and Succession | |
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| What Are the Consequences of Succession? | |
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| The New Executive's Behaviors and Organizational Change | |
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| Implications for Organizational Performance | |
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| Executive Turnover: Beyond the CEO | |
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| Other Interesting Issues for Succession | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Understanding Board Structure, Composition, and Vigilance | |
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| Determinants of Board Structure and Composition | |
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| What Do We Mean by Board Structure and Composition? | |
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| Critical Contingencies | |
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| Institutional Forces | |
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| Agency Conditions | |
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| Determinants of Board Vigilance | |
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| Board Vigilance in Monitoring and Disciplining Top Management | |
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| Competition versus Cooperation in Board-CEO Relations | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| The Consequences of Board Involvement and Vigilance | |
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| Board Involvement in Strategy Formation | |
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| Contextual Conditions Predicting Board Strategic Involvement | |
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| Boards and Firm Performance | |
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| Board Effects on Strategy | |
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| Boards as Supra-Top Management Teams | |
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| Board Monitoring and Disciplinary Behavior | |
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| Boards and Executive Compensation | |
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| Boards and Monitoring Behaviors | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| The Determinants of Executive Compensation | |
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| Organizing Dimensions for a Framework of Executive Compensation | |
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| Direction of Causality | |
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| Theoretical Perspectives | |
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| Unit of Analysis | |
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| Economic Explanations for Executive Compensation | |
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| Research from the Managerialist and Neoclassical Traditions | |
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| Moderators of the Pay-Performance Relationship | |
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| Human Capital | |
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| Marginal Product and the Managerial Labor Market | |
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| Social Explanations for Executive Compensation | |
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| Ismorphism of Executive Compensation | |
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| Social Comparison Processes in the Setting of Executive Pay | |
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| Social Capital | |
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| Political Explanations for Executive Compensation | |
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| Compensation for Business Unit General Managers: Determinants and Consequences | |
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| GM Compensation versus CEO Compensation | |
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| The Determinants of GM Compensation | |
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| The Consequences of GM Compensation | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Executive Compensation: Consequences and Distributions | |
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| Consequences of Executive Compensation | |
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| Economic Explanations for the Consequences of Executive Compensation | |
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| Behavioral Agency Theory | |
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| Social Explanations for the Consequences of Executive Compensation | |
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| Political Explanations for the Consequences of Executive Compensation | |
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| Distribution of Compensation within Top Management Teams | |
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| Pay Differential between CEOs and Other Executives in the Firm | |
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| Pay Dispersion within Top Management Teams | |
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| TMT and CEO Compensation Patterns | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Notes | |
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| References | |
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| Index | |