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Preface | |
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Findings | |
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Issues for the Future | |
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The New Battlefield Balance | |
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Mix of Forces | |
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Communications That Work | |
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Tactical Missile Defenses | |
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Makeup of the Post-Cold War Navy | |
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Operation Desert Storm Examined: Conduct of the War in Southwest Asia | |
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Introduction | |
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Historical legacy | |
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Prelude to War: No Rotation Policy Limits Choices | |
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Air Power: The Most Significant Factor in Winning War | |
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Air Power as an Instrument of War | |
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The Air Tasking Order | |
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Tank Plinking and Other Operation Desert Storm Innovations | |
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Interservice Fights Avoided | |
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Ground Campaign Ultimately Forced Iraqi Military Out of Kuwait | |
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Deception Works | |
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Plans to Fight in Europe Created Problems in Southwest Asia | |
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Using Ground Contingency Units | |
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What the War Reveals About Our Military | |
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High Tech Works | |
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Benefits of High Tech in the Air Campaign | |
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Benefits of High Tech on the Ground | |
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U.S. Troops Most Qualified Ever | |
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Communications Hampered by Old, Incompatible Equipment | |
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Tactical Missile Defenses Succeed Politically, Raise Technical Questions | |
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Minehunting on Land and at Sea | |
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Counting the Iraqi Army | |
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Table I: Accounting for the Iraqi Army | |
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The New Battlefield Balance | |
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New Thinking About Tooth to Tail | |
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Table II: Accounting for the Iraqi Troops: A Rough Estimate of Enemy Strength | |
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Complexity of Warfare Requires Sophisticated Support | |
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Striving for a Balanced Military | |
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Balance in the Force Structure | |
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Balance Within Weapon Systems | |
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Goldwater-Nichols Played a Crucial Role | |
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Goldwater-Nichols Fosters Jointness | |
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Unity of Command Was Key | |
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Jointness Problems Still Remain | |
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Providing the Forces: U.S. Personnel in the Persian Gulf Crisis | |
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The All Volunteer Force (AVF) | |
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Background | |
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How Would the AVF Fight? | |
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But Is It Fair? | |
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Women in the Services | |
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The Guard and Reserve | |
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Background | |
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Planing for World War III | |
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Mobilization - In Pieces by Improvisation | |
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The Shift to a Offensive Option | |
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Army | |
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The Mobilization | |
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Evolution of the Call-Up | |
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Making Units Ready and Measuring Them | |
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What Happened? | |
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Large Combat Units - A Special Case | |
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Overall Impact of Army Guard and Reserve | |
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Marine Corps | |
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The Mobilization | |
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How the Marine Mobilization Evolved | |
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Caught In Midst of Revitalization | |
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Making Units Ready for Deployment | |
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In-Theater Training | |
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Into Combat as Smaller Units | |
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Combat Support and Service Support: A Special Case | |
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Overall Impact of Marine Reserve | |
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Air Force | |
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The Mobilization | |
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Tailored to Meet Requirements | |
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Reserve After Active | |
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Overall Impact of Air Force Guard and Reserve | |
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Navy | |
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The Mobilization | |
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Tailored to Meet Needs | |
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Overall Impact of Navy Reserve | |
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Naval Quarantine in the Persian Gulf Crisis | |
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Introduction | |
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The Naval Quarantine | |
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Typical Interdiction Operations | |
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Importance of Training | |
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Command and Control of MIF Operations | |
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MIF Stopped Flow of Prohibited Items | |
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MIF Effect on Iraqi Warfighting Uncertain | |
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Planning for Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm | |
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Introduction | |
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CENTCOM's New Planning Focus | |
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Planning the Air Campaign | |
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Planned Air Campaign Had Four Phases | |
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Planning for the Ground Offensive | |
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Low Casualties the Highest Goal | |