| List of Figures and Tables | |
| Preface | |
| Acknowledgments | |
| Glossary | |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| Methodology and Sources | p. 3 |
| Unity of Effort and Unity of Command | p. 4 |
| Doctrine and Experience: The Sources of Disharmony | p. 6 |
| The United States Air Force | p. 7 |
| The United States Navy | p. 8 |
| The United States Marine Corps | p. 10 |
| The Issues among the Services | p. 11 |
| Midway, 1942: Prologue | p. 13 |
| The Two Separate Air Battles of Midway | p. 14 |
| Unity of Command | p. 20 |
| Joint Planning | p. 20 |
| Joint Operations | p. 21 |
| Training and Hardware | p. 21 |
| Overall Evaluation | p. 22 |
| The Solomons Campaign, 1942-1944: Joint Air Operations Come of Age | p. 23 |
| The Seizure of Guadalcanal | p. 24 |
| The Isolation of Rabaul | p. 31 |
| Overall Evaluation | p. 33 |
| Korea, 1950-1953: The Renewed Clash of Service Air Command and Control Doctrines | p. 39 |
| The Initial Operations | p. 40 |
| Command Relationships on the Eve of the Conflict | p. 41 |
| Initial Coordination Problems among the Service Components | p. 41 |
| The Emergence of the Joint Operations Center and Differences in Close Air Support Doctrine | p. 43 |
| The Marine Corps Enters the Air Campaign | p. 45 |
| Inchon | p. 46 |
| Integration of "Strategic" and "Tactical" Air Operations | p. 48 |
| The Maturation of the Joint Air Control System | p. 48 |
| Unity of Command | p. 50 |
| Joint Planning | p. 52 |
| Joint Operations | p. 55 |
| Training and Hardware | p. 57 |
| Overall Evaluation | p. 60 |
| Vietnam, 1965-1968: Regression and Progress | p. 63 |
| An Overview | p. 64 |
| Top-Level Command Arrangements in Theater | p. 65 |
| Interface of Fixed-Wing and Helicopter Operations | p. 68 |
| Interface with Marine Operations in I Corps | p. 70 |
| Interface with SAC | p. 74 |
| Apportioning Effort between In- and Out-of-Country Operations | p. 76 |
| Interface with the Navy | p. 77 |
| Unity of Command | p. 78 |
| Joint Planning and Operations | p. 80 |
| Doctrine, Training, and Hardware | p. 80 |
| Overall Evaluation | p. 82 |
| El Dorado Canyon: Unity of Effort without Unity of Command | p. 83 |
| An Overview | p. 84 |
| Unity of Command | p. 87 |
| Joint Planning | p. 88 |
| Joint Operations | p. 93 |
| Doctrine, Training, and Hardware | p. 94 |
| Overall Evaluation | p. 95 |
| Desert Storm: Unity of Control and a Brotherhood of Airmen | p. 97 |
| The Doctrinal and Organizational Prologue | p. 100 |
| An Overview of Desert Storm | p. 102 |
| Unity of Command | p. 125 |
| Joint Planning | p. 127 |
| Joint Operations | p. 129 |
| Doctrine, Hardware, Training, Organization | p. 131 |
| Lessons in Command and Control of Joint Air Operations | p. 133 |
| Overall Evaluation | p. 139 |
| Lessons Learned, Relearned, and Unlearned | p. 141 |
| Unity of Command | p. 144 |
| Force Planning and Doctrine | p. 155 |
| Joint Operations | p. 162 |
| Training and Hardware | p. 165 |
| The New Threat to Jointness in the Aftermath of Desert Storm | p. 168 |
| Looking to the Future | p. 170 |
| Appendix: The Development of Command Relationships in Southeast Asia, 1962-1966 | p. 173 |
| Notes | p. 179 |
| Bibliography | p. 201 |
| Index | p. 209 |
| About the Authors | p. 221 |
| Table of Contents provided by Blackwell. All Rights Reserved. |