Mathematics of Social Choice : Voting, Compensation, and Division
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All the information you need in one place! Each Study Brief is a summary of one specific subject; facts, figures, and explanations to help you learn faster.
Copyright year: 2010
Publisher: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
Size: 7.00" wide x 10.00" long x 0.50" tall
Christoph Bï¿½rgers has been a Professor in the Department of Mathematics at Tufts University since 1994. He has also worked at the University of Michigan and at the IBM T. J. Watson Research Center. He received his PhD from New York University.
|Rule of the majority|
|The Smith set|
|Smith-fairness and the no-weak-spoiler criterion|
|Schulze's beatpath method|
|Elections with many or few voters|
|Irrelevant comparisons and the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem|
|Strategic voting and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem|
|Winner selection versus ranking|
|Irrelevant alternatives and Arrow's theorem|
|Fairness and envy-freeness|
|Pareto-optimability and equitability|
|Equality, equitability and Knaster's procedure|
|Envy-free, Pareto-optimal, and equitable cake cutting|
|'I cut, you choose' for three: Steinhaus' method|
|Hall's marriage theorem|
|'I cut, you choose' for more than three: Kuhn's methods|
|The method of Selfridge and Conway|
|The geometry of Pareto-optimal division between two people|
|The adjusted winner method of Brams and Taylor|
|Conflict resolution using the adjusted winner method|
|Dividing a piecewise homogeneous cake among N>2 people|
|Solutions to selected exercises|