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Preface | |
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Synopsis of the Arguments | |
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Mental Causation and Consciousness: Our Two Mind-Body Problems | |
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Mental Causation and Consciousnessx | |
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The Supervenience/Exclusion Argument | |
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Can We Reduce Qualia? | |
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The Two World-Knots | |
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The Supervenience Argument Motivated, Clarified, and Defended | |
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Nonreductive Physicalism | |
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The Fundamental Idea | |
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The Supervenience Argument Refined and Clarified | |
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Is Overdetermination an Option? | |
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The Generalization Argument | |
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Block's Causal Drainage Argument | |
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The Rejection of Immaterial Minds: A Causal Argument | |
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Cartesian Dualism and Mental Causation | |
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Causation and the "Pairing" Problem | |
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Causality and Space | |
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Why Not Locate Souls in Space? | |
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Concluding Remarks | |
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Reduction, Reductive Explanation, and Closing the "Gap" | |
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Reduction and Reductive Explanation | |
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Bridge-Law Reduction and Functional Reduction | |
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Explanatory Ascent and Constraint (R) | |
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Functional Reduction and Reductive Explanation | |
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Kripkean Identities and Reductive Explanation | |
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Remarks about Block and Stalnaker's Proposal | |
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Explanatory Arguments for Type Physicalism and Why They Don't Work | |
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Are There Positive Arguments for Type Physicalism? | |
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Hill's and McLaughlin's Explanatory Argument | |
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Do Psychoneural Identities Explain Psychoneural Correlations? | |
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Block and Stalnaker's Explanatory Argument | |
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Another Way of Looking at the Two Explanatory Arguments | |
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Physicalism, or Something Near Enough | |
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Taking Stock | |
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Physicalism at a Crossroads | |
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Reducing Minds | |
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Living with the Mental Residue | |
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Where We Are at Last with the Mind-Body Problem | |
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References | |
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Index | |