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| List of Figures and Tables | |
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| Preface and Acknowledgments | |
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| Overview | |
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| What Is Game Theory? | |
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| What Can You Do with Game Theory? | |
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| Four Problems in Political Science | |
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| Why Model? | |
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| The Rational Choice Approach to Social Modeling | |
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| Utility Theory | |
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| The Concept of Rationality | |
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| How Do Utility Functions Predict Actions? | |
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| An Example: Nixon's Christmas Bombing | |
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| Certainty, Risk, and Uncertainty | |
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| Utility Theory under the Condition of Risk | |
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| Some Common Misconceptions about Utility Theory | |
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| Utility Functions and Types of Preferences | |
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| A Simple Example: The Calculus of Deterrence | |
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| Another Simple Example: The Decision to Vote | |
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| Why Might Utility Theory Not Work? | |
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| Specifying a Game | |
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| Formalizing a Situation: Deterrence in the Cuban Missile Crisis | |
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| Games in Extensive Form | |
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| Games in Strategic Form | |
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| Classical Game Theory | |
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| Defining the Terms of Classical Game Theory | |
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| Domination, Best Replies, and Equilibrium | |
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| Mixed Strategies | |
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| The Minmax Theorem and Equilibria of Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games | |
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| Characteristics of Nash Equilibria | |
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| Nash Equilibria and Common Conjectures | |
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| Rationalizability | |
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| Political Reform in Democracies | |
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| Candidate Competition in the Spatial Model of Elections | |
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| A Very Brief Introduction to Cooperative Game Theory | |
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| Solving Extensive-Form Games: Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection | |
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| Backwards Induction | |
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| Subgame Perfection | |
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| Sophisticated Voting | |
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| Agenda Control | |
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| Legislative Rules and Structure-Induced Equilibria | |
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| The Rubinstein Bargaining Model | |
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| Bargaining in Legislatures | |
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| Why Might Backwards Induction Yield Counterintuitive Results? | |
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| Beliefs and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria | |
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| Bayes's Theorem | |
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| The Preference for Biased Information | |
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| Perfect Bayesian Equilibria | |
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| Nuclear Deterrence | |
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| More on Noncooperative Equilibrium: Perfect and Sequential Equilibria | |
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| Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies | |
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| Perfect Equilibrium | |
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| Sequential Equilibrium | |
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| Deterrence and the Signaling of Resolve | |
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| "Why Vote?" Redux | |
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| Games of Limited Information and Restrictions on Beliefs | |
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| Signaling Games | |
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| The Informational Role of Congressional Committees | |
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| Bargaining under Incomplete Information | |
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| Deterrence and Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs | |
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| An Introduction to Restrictions on Beliefs | |
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| "Cheap Talk" and Coordination | |
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| Repeated Games | |
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| Thinking about Repetition: Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma | |
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| Folk Theorems | |
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| Finite Repeated Games: The Chain Store Paradox | |
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| Stationarity | |
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| Retrospective Voting and Electoral Control | |
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| Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here? | |
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| How Do Formal Models Increase Our Knowledge? | |
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| The Weaknesses of Game Theory | |
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| How Does One Build a Model? | |
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| Appendix 1: Basic Mathematical Knowledge | |
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| Algebra | |
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| Set Theory | |
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| Relations and Functions | |
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| Probability Theory | |
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| Limits | |
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| Differential Calculus | |
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| Partial Derivatives and Lagrange Multipliers | |
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| Integral Calculus | |
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| The Idea of a Mathematical Proof | |
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| Answers to Selected Problems | |
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| Notes | |
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| Glossary of Terms in Game Theory | |
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| Bibliography | |
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| Index | |