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| Preface | |
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| Toward a Normative Pragmatics | |
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| Introduction | |
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| From Intentional State to Normative Status | |
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| From Norms Explicit in Rules to Norms Implicit in Practices | |
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| From Normative Status to Normative Attitude | |
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| From Assessment to the Social Institution of Norms | |
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| From Intentional Interpretation to Original Intentionality | |
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| Appendix: Wittgenstein's Use of Regel Toward an Inferential | |
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| Semantics Content and Representation | |
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| The Priority of the Propositional Conceptual | |
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| Classification and Inference Material Inference, Conceptual Content, and Expression | |
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| Circumstances and Consequences of Application | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Linguistic Practice and Discursive Commitment | |
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| Intentional States and Linguistic | |
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| Practices Deontic Status and Deontic Attitudes | |
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| Asserting and Inferring Scorekeeping: Pragmatic Significance and Semantic Content | |
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| Perception and Action: The Conferral of Empirical and Practical Conceptual Content Assertions as Knowledge | |
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| Claims Reliability Observation Reports and Noninferential Authority Rational | |
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| Agency Practical Reasoning: Inferences from Doxastic to Practical Commitments Intentions | |
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| The Expressive Role of Traditional | |
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| Semantic Vocabulary: 'True' and 'Refers' | |
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| From Inference to Truth, Reference, and Representation Truth in Classical Pragmatism | |
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| From Pragmatism to Prosentences | |
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| Reference and Anaphorically Indirect Descriptions | |
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| The Function of Traditional | |
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| Semantic Vocabulary Is Expressive, Not Explanatory Substitution | |
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| What Are Singular Terms, and Why Are There Any? Multivalued Logic and Material Inference Substitution, Sentential Embedding, and Semantic | |
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| Roles Subsentential Expressions What Are Singular Terms? Why Are There Singular Terms? Objections and Replies | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Appendix: From Substitutional Derivation of Categories to Functional Derivation of Categories | |
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| Appendix: Sentence Use Conferring the Status of Singular Terms on Subsentential | |
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| Expressions--An Application Anaphora: The Structure of Token Repeatables | |
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| Objects Definite Descriptions and Existential Commitments Substitution, Token Recurrence, and | |
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| Anaphora Deixis and Anaphora Interpersonal Anaphora and Communication Appendix: Other Kinds of | |
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| Anaphora--Paychecks, Donkeys, and Quantificational Antecedents Ascribing Propositional Attitudes | |
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| The Social Route from Reasoning to Representing Representation and De Re Ascription of Propositionally Contentful Commitments Interpretation, Communication, and De Re Ascriptions | |
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| De Re Ascriptions and the Intentional Explanation of Action | |
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| From Implicit Attribution to Explicit | |
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| Ascription Epistemically Strong De Re Attitudes | |
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| Indexicals, Quasi-Indexicals, and Proper Names The Social-Perspectival Character of Conceptual Contents and the Objectivity of Conceptual Norms | |
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| Appendix: The Construction and Recursive Interpretation of Iterated Ascriptions | |
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| That Mix De Dicto and De Re Content Specifications | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Two Concepts of Concepts Norms and Practices We Have Met the Norms, and They Are Ours | |
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| Abbreviations | |
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| Notes | |
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| Index | |