Public Choice III
Edition: 3rd 2002 (Revised)
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Description: This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of 'Public Choice II' (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been greatly revised.
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All the information you need in one place! Each Study Brief is a summary of one specific subject; facts, figures, and explanations to help you learn faster.
List price: $59.99
Copyright year: 2002
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 2/17/2003
Size: 7.00" wide x 10.00" long x 1.25" tall
Dennis C. Mueller is Professor of Economics at the University of Vienna.
|Origins of the State|
|The reason for collective choice - allocative efficiency|
|The reason for collective choice - redistribution|
|Public Choice in a Direct Democracy|
|The choice of voting rule|
|Majority rule - positive properties|
|Majority rule - normative properties|
|Simple alternatives to majority rule|
|Complicated alternatives to majority rule|
|Exit, voice and disloyalty|
|Public Choice in a Representative Democracy|
|Two-party competition - deterministic voting|
|Two-party competition - probabilistic voting|
|The paradox of voting|
|Legislatures and bureaucracies|
|Applications and Testing|
|Political competition and macroeconomic performance|
|Interest groups, campaign contributions and lobbying|
|The size of government|
|Government size and economic performance|
|Normative public choice|
|Social welfare functions|
|The impossibility of a social ordering|
|A just social contract|
|The constitution as a utilitarian contract|
|Liberal rights and social choices|
|What Have We Learned?|
|Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?|
|Allocation, redistribution, and public choice|