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Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

ISBN-10: 0521796792

ISBN-13: 9780521796798

Edition: 2002

Authors: Thomas Gilovich, Daniel Kahneman, Dale Griffin

List price: $64.99
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Description:

Is our case strong enough to go to trial? Will interest rates go up? Can I trust this person? Such questions - and the judgments required to answer them - are woven into the fabric of everyday experience. This book examines how people make such judgments. The study of human judgment was transformed in the 1970s, when Kahneman and Tversky introduced their 'heuristics and biases' approach and challenged the dominance of strictly rational models. Their work highlighted the reflexive mental operations used to make complex problems manageable and illuminated how the same processes can lead to both accurate and dangerously flawed judgments. The heuristics and biases framework generated a torrent of influential research in psychology - research that reverberated widely and affected scholarship in economics, law, medicine, management, and political science. This book compiles the most influential research in the heuristics and biases tradition since the initial collection of 1982 (by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky). The various contributions develop and critically analyze the initial work on heuristics and biases, supplement these initial statements with emerging theory and empirical findings, and extend the research of the framework to new real-world applications.
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Book details

List price: $64.99
Copyright year: 2002
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 7/8/2002
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 882
Size: 6.25" wide x 9.25" long x 1.25" tall
Weight: 1.628
Language: English

Thomas Gilovich is Professor of Psychology and Co-Director of the Center for Behavioral Economics and Decision Research at Cornell University. He has taught social psychology for 30 years and is the recipient of the Russell Distinguished Teaching Award at Cornell. His research focuses on how people evaluate the evidence of their everyday experience to make judgments, form beliefs, and decide on courses of action. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a fellow of the American Psychological Society, the American Psychological Association, the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, the Society of Experimental Social Psychology, and the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry.

Daniel Kahneman received the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his pioneering work with Amos Tversky on decision-making.

List of Contributors
Preface
Introduction - Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now
Theoretical and Empirical Extensions
Representativeness and Availability
Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment
Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment
How Alike Is It? versus How Likely Is It?: A Disjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgments
Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived Likelihood of Contracting a Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of Imagery
The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Information
Anchoring, Contamination, and Compatibility
Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value
Putting Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic
Self-Anchoring in Conversation: Why Language Users Do Not Do What They "Should"
Inferential Correction
Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem
Sympathetic Magical Thinking: The Contagion and Similarity "Heuristics"
Compatibility Effects in Judgment and Choice
Forecasting, Confidence, and Calibration
The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence
Inside the Planning Fallacy: The Causes and Consequences of Optimistic Time Predictions
Probability Judgment across Cultures
Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting
Optimism
Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions
Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability
When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism
Norms and Counterfactuals
Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives
Counterfactual Thought, Regret, and Superstition: How to Avoid Kicking Yourself
New Theoretical Directions
Two Systems of Reasoning
Two Systems of Reasoning
The Affect Heuristic
Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?
Support Theory
Support Theory: A Nonextensional Representation of Subjective Probability
Unpacking, Repacking, and Anchoring: Advances in Support Theory
Remarks on Support Theory: Recent Advances and Future Directions
Alternative Perspectives on Heuristics
The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning
Feelings as Information: Moods Influence Judgments and Processing Strategies
Automated Choice Heuristics
How Good Are Fast and Frugal Heuristics?
Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors: Exploring the Empirical Implications of Deviant Functionalist Metaphors
Real-World Applications
Everyday Judgment and Behavior
The Hot Hand in Basketball: on the Misperception of Random Sequences
Like Goes with Like: The Role of Representativeness in Erroneous and Pseudo-Scientific Beliefs
When Less Is More: Counterfactual Thinking and Satisfaction among Olympic Medalists
Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives
Expert Judgment
Assessing Uncertainty in Physical Constants
Do Analysts Overreact?
The Calibration of Expert Judgment: Heuristics and Biases Beyond the Laboratory
Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment
Heuristics and Biases in Application
Theory-Driven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics
References
Index