Game Theory and Politics

ISBN-10: 0486434974

ISBN-13: 9780486434971

Edition: 2004

Authors: Steven J. Brams

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In this illuminating and instructive survey, Brams demonstrates both the insights and the pitfalls that can result from applying game theoretic models to the analysis of problems in political science. Using real-life examples, he shows how game theory can explain and elucidate complex political situations, from warfare to presidential vetoes. In these cases and others, game theory's mathematical structure provides a rigorous, consistent method for formulating, analyzing, and solving strategic problems. Minimal mathematical background is necessary, making this book accessible to a wide audience of students and teachers of politics and the social sciences as well as other readers with a serious interest in politics. 1975 ed. 24 figures
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Book details

List price: $17.95
Copyright year: 2004
Publisher: Dover Publications, Incorporated
Publication date: 11/24/2011
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 336
Size: 6.00" wide x 9.00" long x 0.50" tall
Weight: 0.946
Language: English

Steven J. Brams is professor of politics at New York University.

Preface to the Dover Edition
Introductory Note
List of Tables
List of Figures
International Relations Games
Two-Person Zero-Sum Games with Saddlepoints
Information in Games
Two-Person Zero-Sum Games without Saddlepoints
Pure and Mixed Strategies
Interpretation of Mixed Strategies
Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games
Prisoner's Dilemma and the Theory of Metagames
Chicken and the Cuban Missile Crisis
Summary and Conclusion
Qualitative Voting Games
Voting Procedures
Sincere Voting
Straightforward Strategies and Voting Procedures
Equilibrium Choices and Vulnerability
Desirable Strategies and Equilibria
The Relationship between Desirable and Admissible Strategies
Sophisticated Voting
Coalitions and Information
Voting on Voting Procedures
The Paradox of Voting
Empirical Examples
Summary and Conclusion
Quantitative Voting Games
Requirements for a Voting System of Proportional Representation
Rules that Meet the Requirements
Interdependence of the Requirements
The Effects of Size
Information and the Choice of Strategies
Empirical Examples
Summary and Conclusion
Vote-Trading Games
What the General Possibility Theorem Precludes
Judgments about Vote Trading
Definitions and Assumptions
Sincere and Insincere Voting
Initial Trades and the Paradox of Vote Trading
Subsequent Trades and the Instability of Vote Trading
The Consequences of Refusing to Trade
The Consequences of Forming Coalitions
Conditions Limiting Vote Trading
Empirical Examples of the Paradox of Vote Trading
Summary and Conclusion
Voting Power
The Shapley-Shubik Index of Voting Power
The Banzhaf Index of Voting Power
Coalition Models of the Two Power Indices
Calculation of the Power Indices
Three Paradoxes of Voting Power
Empirical Applications of the Power Indices
Summary and Conclusion
Coalition Games
Power and Coalitions
Restrictions on Coalition Alignments
The Stability of Alignments
Empirical Conclusions of the Luce-Rogow Model
The Concept of Winning
The Size Principle
The Information Effect
Empirical Evidence for the Size Principle
Criticisms of the Size Principle
An Alternative Goal: Maximizing One's Share of Spoils
Summary and Conclusion
Election Games
The Need for Models to Assess the Consequences of Electoral Reform
Presidential Campaigns and Voting Behavior
The Goals of Candidates
The Popular-Vote Model
The Electoral-Vote Model
The 3/2's Allocation Rule
Why the Large States Are Favored
Testing the Models
Campaign Allocations and Biases through 1980
Limitations and Extensions of the Models
Summary and Conclusion
Annotated Bibliography
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