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Foreword | |
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Introduction | |
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A Few Major Characters | |
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The Corporatist Turn in American Regulation | |
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The Path to Enactment | |
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The Two Goals of the Dodd-Frank Act | |
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A Brief Tour of Other Reforms | |
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Two Themes That Emerge | |
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Fannie Mae Effect | |
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Covering Their Tracks | |
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Is There Anything to Like? | |
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Relearning the Financial Crisis | |
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The Lehman Myth | |
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The Stock Narrative | |
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Lehman in Context | |
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Lehman's Road to Bankruptcy | |
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Lehman in Bankruptcy | |
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Bear Stearns Counterfactual | |
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Road to Chrysler | |
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Chrysler Bankruptcy | |
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General Motors "Sale" | |
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From Myths to Legislative Reality | |
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The 2010 Financial Reforms | |
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Geithner, Dodd, Frank, and the Legislative Grinder | |
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The Players | |
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TARP and the Housing Crisis | |
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Road to an East Room Signing | |
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Channeling Brandeis: The Volcker Rule | |
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The Goldman Moment | |
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Derivatives Reform: Clearinghouses and the Plain-Vanilla Derivative | |
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Basic Framework | |
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Derivatives and the New Finance | |
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The Stout Alternative | |
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New Clearinghouses and Exchanges | |
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Regulatory Dilemmas of Clearinghouses | |
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Disclosure and Data Collection | |
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Making It Work? | |
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Banking Reform: Breaking Up Was Too Hard to Do | |
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Basic Framework | |
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New Designator and Designatees | |
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Will the New Capital Standards Work? | |
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Contingent Capital Alternative | |
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Volcker Rule | |
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What Do the Brandeisian Concessions Mean? | |
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Office of Minority and Women Inclusion | |
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Institutionalizing the Government-Bank Partnership | |
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A Happier Story? | |
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Repo Land Mine | |
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Unsafe at Any Rate | |
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Basic Framework | |
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Who Is Elizabeth Warren? | |
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Toasters and Credit Cards | |
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The New Consumer Bureau | |
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Mortgage Broker and Securitization Rules | |
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Consequences: What to Expect from the New Bureau | |
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What It Means for the Government-Bank Partnership | |
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Banking on the FDIC (Resolution Authority I) | |
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Does the FDIC Play the Same Role in Both Regimes? | |
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How (and How Well) Does FDIC Resolution Work? | |
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Moving Beyond the FDIC Analogy | |
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Bailouts, Bankruptcy, or Better? (Resolution Authority II) | |
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Basic Framework | |
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The Trouble with Bailouts | |
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Who Will Invoke Dodd-Frank Resolution, and When? | |
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Triggering the New Framework | |
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Controlling Systemic Risk | |
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Third Objective: Haircuts | |
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All Liquidation, All the Time? | |
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The Future | |
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Essential Fixes and the New Financial Order | |
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What Works and What Doesn't | |
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Staying Derivatives in Bankruptcy | |
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ISDA and Its Discontent | |
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Other Bankruptcy Reforms for Financial Institutions | |
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Plugging the Chrysler Hole in Bankruptcy | |
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Bankruptcy to the Rescue | |
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An International Solution? | |
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Basic Framework | |
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Problems of Cross-Border Cases | |
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Scholarly Silver Bullets | |
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Dodd-Frank's Contribution to Cross-Border Issues | |
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New Living Wills | |
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A Simple Treaty Might Do | |
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Risk of a Clearinghouse Crisis | |
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Reinvigorating the Rule of Law | |
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Conclusion | |
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Notes | |
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Bibliography | |
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Acknowledgments | |
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About the Author | |
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Index | |