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| Preface | |
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| About the Authors | |
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| Reason in Law | |
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| What Legal Reasoning Is, and Why It Matters | |
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| An Overview of Law and Politics | |
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| A Definition of Law | |
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| A Definition of Legal Reasoning | |
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| Sources of Official Legal Texts | |
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| The Choices That Legal Reasoning Confronts | |
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| Illustrative Case | |
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| Questions about the Case | |
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| Change and Stability in Legal Reasoning | |
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| Sources of Unpredictibility in Law | |
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| The Disorderly Conduct of Words | |
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| The Unpredictability of Precedents | |
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| Reasoning by Example in General | |
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| Examples in Law | |
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| The Three-Step Process of Reasoning by Example | |
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| How Reasoning by Example Perpetuates Unpredictability in Law | |
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| An Illustration of Unpredictability in Law | |
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| Reasoning by Example Facilitates Legal Change | |
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| Is Unpredictability in Law Desirable? | |
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| The Other Side of the Coin: Stare Decisis as a Stabilizing and Clarifying Element in Law | |
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| Illustrative Cases | |
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| Questions about the Cases | |
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| Common Law | |
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| Origins of Common Law | |
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| Reasoning by Example in Common Law | |
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| The Cherry Tree | |
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| The Pit | |
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| The Diving Board | |
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| Keeping the Common-Law Tradition Alive | |
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| Making Common Law without Close Precedents | |
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| Horizontal Stare Decisis in Common Law | |
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| Rightly Adhering to Precedent Because the Need for Stability and Reliance is Present | |
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| Wrongly Adhering to Precedent When Stability Is Unnecessary | |
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| The Common-Law Tradition Today | |
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| Illustrative Case | |
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| Questions about the Case | |
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| Statutory Interpretation | |
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| What are Statutes? | |
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| Four Misguided Approaches to Statutory Interpretation | |
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| Literalism: Sticking to the Words | |
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| The Golden Rule | |
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| Canons of Statutory Construction | |
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| Legislative Intent | |
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| Other Words in the Statute | |
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| The Expressed Intent of Individual Legislators and Committee Reports | |
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| Other Actions, Events, and Decisions in the Legislature | |
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| The Perils of Legislative Intent | |
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| Purpose: The Key to Wise Statutory Interpretation | |
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| The Centrality of Statutory Purpose | |
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| Determining Purpose: Words Can Help | |
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| Determining Purpose: The Audience | |
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| Determining Purpose: The Assumption of Legislative Rationality and the Uses of Legislative History | |
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| Illustrations of Statutory Purpose | |
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| Two Easy Cases | |
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| The Case of the Lady Jurors, or Why Legislative Intent Does Not Determine Statutory Purpose | |
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| Statutory Purpose in the Cases of Criminal Commerce: Caminetti, McBoyle, and Alpers | |
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| A Final Complication | |
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| Stare Decisis in Statutory Interpretation | |
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| Major League Baseball, Haviland's Dog and Pony Show, and Government Regulation of Business | |
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| The Case against Increased Adherence to Precedent in Statutory Interpretation | |
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| A Summary Statement of the Appropriate Judicial Approach to Statutory Interpretation | |
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| Illustrative Case | |
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| Questions about the Case | |
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| Interpreting the United States Constitution | |
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| "The Supreme Law of the Land" | |
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| Conventional Legal Reasoning in Constitutional Interpretation | |
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| Words as Channels of Meaning | |
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| Original Intent and Purpose | |
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| Stare (In) Decisis | |
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| Judicial Review and Democratic Theory | |
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| Theories of Judicial Self-Restraint | |
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| Political Constraints on the Court | |
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| The Turn to Individual Dignity | |
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| Illustrative Case | |
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| Questions about the Case | |
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| Law and Politics | |
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| Legal Reasoning as Liberal Justification | |
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| A Recap | |
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| Impartiality and Trust | |
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| Impartial Judgment | |
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| The Value of Impartiality | |
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| Applying the Theory | |
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| Legal Reasoning as a Public Language | |
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| Law and Moralistic Communities: The Mann Act Revisited | |
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| Law in Conditions of Diversity: Emerging Issues of Gay Rights | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Illustrative Case | |
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| Introduction to Legal Procedure and Terminology | |
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| The Case | |
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| Legal Terms | |
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| Bush v. Gore | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Protest Phase | |
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| The Contest Phase | |
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| Questions | |
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| Conclusion: Why Legal Reasoning Matters | |
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| Credits | |
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| Index | |
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| Index of Cases | |