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| Introduction : getting the big things right enough | |
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| The contexts of war are all important | |
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| War is about peace, and peace can be about war | |
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| It is more difficult to make peace than it is to make war | |
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| War works! - but always has unintended and unanticipated consequences | |
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| Peace and order are not self-enforcing, they have to be organized and kept by somebody | |
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| Not only polities, but societies and their cultures make war and peace | |
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| Reason reigns over war, but passion and chance threaten to rule | |
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| There is more to war than warfare | |
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| Policy is king, but often is ignorant of the nature and character of war | |
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| War is always a gamble | |
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| Knowledge of strategy is vital : the flame of strategic understanding has to be kept lit | |
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| Strategy is more difficult than policy or tactics | |
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| Bad strategy kills, but so also do bad policy and tactics | |
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| If Thucydides, Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz did not say it, it probably is not worth saying | |
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| The strategic "Concept du Jour" will be tomorrow's stale left-over, until it is rediscovered, recycled, and revealed as a new truth | |
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| The enemy too has a vote | |
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| Time is the least forgiving dimension of strategy | |
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| Friction is unavoidable, but need not be fatal | |
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| All strategy is geostrategy : geography is fundamental | |
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| Strategy is not wholly military | |
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| The impossible is impossible; it is a condition, not a problem for which a solution has yet to be found | |
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| People matter most | |
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| Military power is trumps in politics | |
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| Military excellence can only be verified by performance in war | |
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| Military excellence cannot guarantee strategic success | |
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| Victory in battle does not ensure strategic or political success, but defeat all but guarantees failure | |
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| There is more to war than firepower : the enemy is not just a target set | |
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| Logistics is the arbiter of strategic opportunity | |
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| Bad times return | |
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| There are always thugs, villains, rogues, and fools out there, as well some in here, who mean us harm | |
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| Superthreats do appear | |
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| Prudence is the supreme virtue in statecraft and strategy | |
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| Strategic history punishes good intentions | |
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| Defense costs are certain, but security benefits are uncertain and arguable | |
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| Arms can be controlled, but not by arms control | |
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| Nothing of real importance changes : modern history is not modern | |
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| History can be misused to "prove" anything, but it is all that we have as a guide to the future | |
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| The future is not foreseeable : nothing dates so rapidly as today's tomorrow | |
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| Surprise is unavoidable, but its effect is not | |
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| Tragedy happens | |
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| Afterword : cannon lore | |