Oligopoly Pricing Old Ideas and New Tools

ISBN-10: 026272040X

ISBN-13: 9780262720403

Edition: 1999 (Reprint)

Authors: Xavier Vives

List price: $45.00
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The "oligopoly problem"--the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors--is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field--including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson--to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.
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Book details

List price: $45.00
Copyright year: 1999
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 7/27/2001
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 441
Size: 5.75" wide x 9.00" long x 1.00" tall
Weight: 1.298
Language: English

Ideas of the Founding Fathers: Oligopoly Theory and Modern Game Theory
Game Theory Tools
Games in Normal Form and Nash Equilibrium
Supermodular Games and Lattice Programming
Lattices and Tarski's Theorem
Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions, Lattice Programming, and Complementarity
Supermodular Games
Existence Results for Quasi-increasing and Decreasing Best Replies
Quasi-increasing Best Replies in Symmetric Games
Decreasing Best Replies in n-Player Games
Mixed Strategies
Dominance Solvability and Rationalizability
Tatonnement Stability
Incomplete Information and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Lattice Programming under Uncertainty
Information Structures and Signals
Bayesian Equilibrium
Foundations of Partial Equilibrium Analysis
A Canonical Partial Equilibrium Model
Small Expenditure Shares and Small Income Effects
Consumer Surplus Analysis
Quantity Competition: The Cournot Model
The Model and Existence of Equilibrium
Characterization of Smooth Cournot Games
Comparative Statics and Entry
Comparative Statics
Large Markets
Price Competition: The Models of Bertrand and Edgeworth
Bertrand Competition
Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition
Rationing Rules and Contingent Demand
Equilibria: The Existence Problem
Mixed Strategies
Price Competition and the Cournot Model
Large Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets
Concluding Remark: The Rationale for Mixed Strategies
Product Differentiation
Demand Systems
Quantity and Price Competition
Characterization and Comparison of Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
Large Markets and Monopolistic Competition
Bertand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin Competition
Monopolistic Competition and Entry
Product Selection and Complementary Products
Conjectures, Reactions, and Commitment
Conjectural Variations
Supply Functions
Capacity Determining Competitive Supply
Choice of Strategy Space
Collusion and Facilitating Practices
Commitment and Pricing
The Stackelberg Model
Entry Deterrence, Limit Pricing, and Incumbency Advantages
A Taxonomy of Strategic Behavior
Competition with Asymmetric Information
Static Competition with Incomplete Information
Existence of Bayesian Equilibrium
The Linear-Normal Model
Monopolistic Competition with Private Information
Information Sharing
Information Exchange in Oligopoly
Monopolistic Competition: Trade Associations and Disclosure Rules
Welfare Analysis
Strategic Information Transmission
Information Exchange, Collusion, and Mechanism Design
Mechanism Design and Collusion
Collusion in a Cournot Market
Collusion in a Large Market
Information Sharing in Large Markets
Commitment under Uncertainty and Information Manipulation
Uncertainty, Flexibility, and Commitment
Observability, Commitment, and Private Information
Limit Pricing and Signaling Distortions
Price Setting and Information Manipulation
Repeated Interaction and Dynamics
Repeated Interaction and Collusion
Finite Horizon
Infinite Horizon
Uncertainty and Imperfect Monitoring
Collusive Pricing and Fluctuations
Private Information, Communication, and Collusion
Dynamic Pricing and Commitment
Alternating Move Duopoly Games
A Taxonomy of Strategic Behavior with Adjustment Costs
Commitment and Pricing in Continuous Time
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