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Acknowledgments | |
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Questions | |
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Consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective | |
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Questions | |
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Overview: The architecture of the book | |
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Tools I | |
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Overview: Mental representation and phenomenal states | |
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From mental to phenomenal representation: Information processing, intentional content, and conscious experience | |
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Introspectability as attentional availability | |
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Availability for cognitive processing | |
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Availability for the control of action | |
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From mental to phenomenal simulation: The generation of virtual experiential worlds through dreaming, imagination, and planning | |
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From mental to phenomenal presentation: Qualia | |
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What is a quale? | |
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Why qualia don't exist | |
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An argument for the elimination of the canonical concept of a quale | |
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Presentational content | |
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Phenomenal presentation | |
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The principle of presentationality | |
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The principle of reality generation | |
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The principle of nonintrinsicality and context sensitivity | |
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The principle of object formation | |
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The Representational Deep Structure of Phenomenal Experience | |
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What is the conceptual prototype of a phenomenal representatum? | |
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Multilevel constraints: What makes a neural representation a phenomenal representation? | |
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Global availability | |
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Activation within a window of presence | |
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Integration into a coherent global state | |
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Convolved holism | |
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Dynamicity | |
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Perspectivalness | |
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Transparency | |
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Offline activation | |
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Representation of intensities | |
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"Ultrasmoothness": The homogeneity of simple content | |
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Adaptivity | |
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Phenomenal mental models | |
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Neurophenomenological Case Studies I | |
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Reality testing: The concept of a phenomenal model of reality | |
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Deviant phenomenal models of reality | |
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Agnosia | |
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Neglect | |
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Blindsight | |
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Hallucinations | |
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Dreams | |
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The concept of a centered phenomenal model of reality | |
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Tools II | |
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Overview: Mental self-representation and phenomenal self-consciousness | |
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From mental to phenomenal self-representation: Mereological intentionality | |
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From mental to phenomenal self-simulation: Self-similarity, autobiographical memory, and the design of future selves | |
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From mental to phenomenal self-presentation: Embodiment and immediacy | |
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The Representational Deep Structure of the Phenomenal First-Person Perspective | |
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What is a phenomenal self-model? | |
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Multilevel constraints for self-consciousness: What turns a neural system-model into a phenomenal self? | |
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Global availability of system-related information | |
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Situatedness and virtual self-presence | |
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Being-in-a-world: Full immersion | |
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Convolved holism of the phenomenal self | |
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Dynamics of the phenomenal self | |
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Transparency: From system-model to phenomenal self | |
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Virtual phenomenal selves | |
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Adaptivity: The self-model as a tool and as a weapon | |
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Descriptive levels of the human self-model | |
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Neural correlates | |
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Cognitive correlates | |
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Social correlates | |
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Levels of content within the human self-model | |
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Spatial and nonspatial content | |
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Transparent and opaque content | |
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The attentional subject | |
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The cognitive subject | |
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Agency | |
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Perspectivalness: The phenomenal model of the intentionality relation | |
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Global availability of transient subject-object relations | |
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Phenomenal presence of a knowing self | |
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Phenomenal presence of an agent | |
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The self-model theory of subjectivity | |
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Neurophenomenological Case Studies II | |
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Impossible egos | |
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Deviant phenomenal models of the self | |
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Anosognosia | |
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Ich-Storungen: Identity disorders and disintegrating self-models | |
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Hallucinated selves: Phantom limbs, out-of-body-experiences, and hallucinated agency | |
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Multiple selves: Dissociative identity disorder | |
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Lucid dreams | |
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The concept of a phenomenal first-person perspective | |
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Preliminary Answers | |
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The neurophenomenological caveman, the little red arrow, and the total flight simulator: From full immersion to emptiness | |
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Preliminary answers | |
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Being no one | |
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References | |
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Name Index | |
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Subject Index | |