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Modularity of Mind

ISBN-10: 0262560259

ISBN-13: 9780262560252

Edition: 1983

Authors: Jerry A. Fodor

List price: $30.00
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Description:

This study synthesizes current information from the various fields of cognitive science in support of a new and exciting theory of mind. Most psychologists study horizontal processes like memory and information flow; Fodor postulates a vertical and modular psychological organization underlying biologically coherent behaviors. This view of mental architecture is consistent with the historical tradition of faculty psychology while integrating a computational approach to mental processes. One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in artificial intelligence. Jerry A. Fodor is Professor of Psychology and Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at MIT.
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Book details

List price: $30.00
Copyright year: 1983
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 4/6/1983
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 158
Size: 5.50" wide x 8.25" long x 0.50" tall
Weight: 0.638
Language: English

Frank Biermann is Professor of Political Science and Environmental Policy Sciences at VU University Amsterdam and Visiting Professor of Earth System Governance at Lund University. He is the author, coauthor, or editor of fifteen books, including Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies (coedited with Bernd Siebenh�ner) and Global Environmental Governance Reconsidered (coedited with Philipp Pattberg), both published by the MIT Press.Jerry A. Fodor is State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He is the author of The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology (MIT Press) and other books.

Acknowledgments
Four Accounts of Mental Structure
A Functional Taxonomy of Cognitive Mechanisms
Input Systems as Modules
Central Systems
Caveats and Conclusions
Notes
References