Environment and Statecraft The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making
List price: $36.95
30 day, 100% satisfaction guarantee
If an item you ordered from TextbookRush does not meet your expectations due to an error on our part, simply fill out a return request and then return it by mail within 30 days of ordering it for a full refund of item cost.
Learn more about our returns policy
Description: Environmental problems like global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion can only be remedied if states cooperate with one another. But sovereign states usually care only about their own interests. So states must somehow restructure the incentives to make cooperation pay. This is what treaties are meant to do. A few treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, succeed. Most, however, fail to alter the state behaviour appreciably. This book develops a theory that explains both the successes and the failures. In particular, the book explains when treaties are needed, why some work better than others, and how treaty design can be improved. The best treaties strategically manipulate the incentives states have to exploit the environment, and the theory developed in this book shows how treaties can do this. The theory integrates a number of disciplines, including economics, political science, international law, negotiation analysis, and game theory. It also offers a coherent and consistent approach. The essential assumption is that treaties be self-enforcing-that is, individually rational, collectively rational, and fair. The book applies the theory to a number of environmental problems. It provides information on more than three hundred treaties, and analyses a number of case studies in detail. These include depletion of the ozone layer, whaling, pollution of the Rhine, acid rain, over-fishing, pollution of the oceans, and global climate change. The essential lesson of the book is that treaties should not just tell countries what to do. Treaties must make it in the interests of countries to behave differently. That is, they must restructure the underlying game. Most importantly, they must create incentives for states to participate in a treaty and for parties to comply.
Rush Rewards U
You have reached 400 XP and carrot coins. That is the daily max!
Limited time offer:
Get the first one free!
All the information you need in one place! Each Study Brief is a summary of one specific subject; facts, figures, and explanations to help you learn faster.
List price: $36.95
Copyright year: 2005
Publisher: Oxford University Press, Incorporated
Publication date: 1/5/2006
Size: 6.50" wide x 9.25" long x 1.00" tall
|List of Figures|
|List of Tables|
|Preface and Acknowledgments|
|The North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty and the Theory of International Cooperation|
|Transnational Cooperation Dilemmas|
|Games with Multiple Equilibria|
|Customary Rights and Responsibilities|
|International Environmental Agreements|
|The Treaty Participation Game|
|The Montreal Protocol|
|Compliance and the Strategy of Reciprocity|
|The Depth and Breadth of International Cooperation|
|Trade Leakage and Trade Linkage|
|The Side Payments Game|
|Global Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol|
|Afterword to the Paperback Edition on Global Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol|