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Moral Realism A Defence

ISBN-10: 0199280207

ISBN-13: 9780199280209

Edition: 2005

Authors: Russ Shafer-Landau

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Description:

Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. In the tradition of Plato and G. E. Moore, Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. These principles are a fundamental aspect of reality, just as much as those that govern mathematics or the natural world. They may be true regardless of our ability to grasp them, and their truth is not amatter of their being ratified from any ideal standpoint, nor of being the object of actual or hypothetical consensus, nor of being an expression of our rational nature. Shafer-Landau accepts Plato's and Moore's contention that moral truths are sui generis. He rejects the currently popular efforts to conceive of ethics as a kind of science, and insists that moral truths and properties occupy a distinctive area in our ontology. Unlike scientific truths, the fundamental moral principles are knowable a priori. And unlike mathematical truths, they are essentially normative: intrinsically action-guiding, and supplying a justification for all who follow theircounsel. Moral Realism is the first comprehensive treatise defending non-naturalistic moral realism in over a generation. It ranges over all of the central issues in contemporary metaethics, and will be an important source of discussion for philosophers and their students interested in issues concerning the foundations of ethics.
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Book details

Copyright year: 2005
Publisher: Oxford University Press, Incorporated
Publication date: 7/14/2005
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 336
Size: 6.25" wide x 9.00" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 1.386

Introduction
Realism and Its Critics
The Non-cognitivist Challenge
What Moral Realism Is
The Non-cognitivist Challenge
A Critique of Non-cognitivism
Conclusion
The Constructivist Challenge
Subjectivism and Objectivism
Moral and Non-moral Constraints
Four Constructivist Critiques
Conclusion
Moral Metaphysics
Ethical Non-naturalism
Moore's Argument
Naturalism and Non-naturalism
Against Classical Naturalism
Non-naturalistic Metaphysics
Conclusion
Supervenience and Causation
Metaphysical Worries
The First Supervenience Argument
The Second Supervenience Argument
The Causal Argument
Conclusion
Moral Motivation
Motivational Humeanism
The Non-cognitivist Argument
The Attractions of Anti-Humeanism
Five Humean Arguments
Conclusion
Motivational Judgement Internalism
A Taxonomy of Internalisms
The Amoralist
An Objection
The Examples
Internalist Worries
Conclusion
Moral Reasons
Reasons Internalism
The Scope of Practical Reason
Varieties of Reasons Internalism
Arguments for Reasons Internalism
Two Arguments against Internalism
Conclusion
Moral Rationalism
Realism and Rationalism
A Presumptive Argument for Moral Rationalism
Four Antirationalist Arguments
Partners in Crime
Conclusion
Rationality and Disagreement
The Argument from Disagreement
Explaining Actual Disagreement
Explaining Hypothesized Disagreement
Conclusion
Moral Knowledge
Moral Scepticism
The Master Argument
Realism and Epistemic Inaccessibility
Four Sceptical Arguments
Believing Where We Cannot Prove
Conclusion
The Justification of Moral Principles
The Appeal to Self-Evidence
Objections to Self-Evidence
Conclusion
The Justification of Verdictive Beliefs
Three Models of Ethical Theory
Moral Reliabilism
Objections to Moral Reliabilism
Identifying Reliable Processes: Some Preliminaries
Identifying Reliable Processes: The Role of Exemplars
Conclusion
References