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| Preface to the Third Edition | |
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| Preface to the First Edition | |
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| Acknowledgments | |
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| Ontology: The Identity Theory and Functionalism | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Behaviorism | |
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| Excerpt from About Behaviorism | |
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| The Identity Theory and Machine Functionalism | |
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| Is Consciousness a Brain Process? | |
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| The Causal Theory of the Mind | |
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| The Nature of Mental States | |
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| Troubles with Functionalism (excerpt) | |
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| Anomalous Monism | |
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| Mental Events | |
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| Homuncular and Teleological Functionalism | |
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| The Continuity of Levels of Nature | |
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| Intentionality | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Psychosemantics | |
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| Information and Representation | |
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| Biosemantics | |
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| A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics (excerpt) | |
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| Other Approaches to Intentionality | |
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| Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality | |
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| The Computational Theory of Mind and Artificial Intelligence | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Language of Thought and Computationalism | |
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| Why There Has to Be and How There Could Be a Private Language | |
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| Which Language Do We Think With? | |
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| Artificial Intelligence | |
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| Semantic Engines: An Introduction to Mind Design | |
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| Can Computers Think? | |
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| Eliminativism, Neurophilosophy, and Anti-Representationalism | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Eliminativism | |
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| Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes | |
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| Connectionism | |
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| Neural Representation and Neural Computation | |
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| Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture (excerpt) | |
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| Dynamical Systems Theory and Robotics | |
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| What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation? | |
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| Intelligence Without Representation | |
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| Instrumentalism and Folk Psychology | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Instrumentalism | |
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| True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works | |
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| Dennett on Intentional Systems | |
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| Real Patterns | |
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| Simulationism and the Theory Theory | |
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| Folk Psychology as Simulation | |
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| Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory? (excerpt) | |
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| Mental Causation, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge | |
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| Introduction | |
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| For and Against Folk Psychology | |
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| Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis | |
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| Folk Psychology is Here to Stay | |
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| Supervenient Causation | |
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| Mental Causation | |
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| Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical | |
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| For and Against Externalism | |
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| Individualism and Supervenience | |
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| The Argument from Causal Powers | |
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| Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions and Unicorns | |
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| Self-Knowledge | |
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| Knowing One's Own Mind | |
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| Externalism and Inference | |
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| Radical Externalism | |
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| The Extended Mind | |
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| Consciousness, Qualia, and Subjectivity | |
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| Introduction | |
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| What Is Consciousness? | |
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| How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness | |
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| What Should We Expect from a Theory of Consciousness? | |
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| Consciousness and its Place in Nature (excerpt) | |
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| Conscious Awareness | |
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| A Theory of Consciousness (excerpt) | |
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| The Superiority of HOP to HOT | |
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| Perception without Awareness | |
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| What It's Like | |
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| Epiphenomenal Qualia | |
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| Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos? | |
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| Qualia | |
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| The Intrinsic Quality of Experience | |
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| Sensation and the Content of Experience | |
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| Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism? | |
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| Perceptual Content | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Simple Seeing | |
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| Excerpts from The Varieties of Reference | |
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| Non-conceptual Content | |
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| Experience Without the Head | |
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| Animal Minds | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Rational Animals | |
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| The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything it is Like to be a Honey Bee? | |
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| Why the Question of Animal Consciousness Might Not Matter Very Much | |
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| Emotion | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Emotions and Choice | |
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| Embodied Emotions | |
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| Is Emotion a Natural Kind? | |
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| Author Index | |
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| Subject Index | |