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Preface | |
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Figures | |
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Tables | |
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Summary | |
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Acknowledgments | |
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Abbreviations | |
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Introduction | |
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Background | |
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Research Purpose and Approach | |
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Organization of This Monograph | |
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A Primer on Tort and No-Fault Systems | |
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Conventional Tort Approaches to Automobile Insurance | |
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No-Fault Approaches to Automobile Insurance | |
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Variations on No-Fault and Tort Approaches | |
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Add-On Coverage | |
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Choice | |
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A Typology of Auto-Insurance Regimes | |
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Conclusion | |
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A Brief History of No-Fault | |
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The Emergence of Fault and No-Fault: 1875-1915 | |
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As Automobile Accidents Increased, Academics Recommended Extending a No-Fault Workers' Compensation Approach to Compensating Victims of Automobile Accidents: 1915-1940 | |
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As Automobile-Accident Costs Continue to Rise, More Studies Call for Variations on a No-Fault Approach to Auto Insurance: 1940-1970 | |
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Massachusetts Becomes the First State to Adopt No-Fault: 1965-1970 | |
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Insurance Industry Divides Over No-Fault | |
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Rise of No-Fault and Consumer Rights: 1970-1985 | |
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Evaluations of No-Fault Were Generally Positive but Noted Higher-Than-Expected Premium Costs | |
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The California Experience with No-Fault | |
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The Attempt to Enact Federal Choice No-Fault: 1998-2003 | |
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The Political Situation Today | |
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Conclusion | |
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The Cost of No-Fault | |
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Aggregate Cost Trends Among States | |
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Aggregate Cost Trends Among No-Fault States That Differ in Size and Threshold Type | |
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Aggregate Cost Trends in States That Repealed No-Fault | |
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Conclusion | |
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Why Have No-Fault Regimes Been More Expensive Than Anticipated? | |
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Does No-Fault Lead to More Accidents? | |
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Does No-Fault Lead to Higher Claiming Rates When Accidents Occur? | |
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Are Costs per Claim Higher for No-Fault? | |
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Does No-Fault Provide a More Victim-Friendly but More Expensive System? | |
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Does No-Fault Offer Higher Reimbursement to Victims Than Tort Does? | |
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Does No-Fault Result in Faster Claim Processing? | |
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Does No-Fault Create Greater Consumer Satisfaction? | |
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Did No-Fault Reduce Litigation? | |
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Does No-Fault Create Greater Incentives for Fraud? | |
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Threshold Overclaiming | |
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Claiming for Hard-to-Verify Injuries | |
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Are Claims for Lost Work Higher Under No-Fault? | |
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Does No-Fault Provide Different Levels of Reimbursement for Noneconomic Damages? | |
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Does No-Fault Encourage Greater Claiming of Medical Services? | |
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How Likely Is a Claimant to Use a Particular Category of Medical Provider? | |
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How Many Visits to a Medical Provider Is a Victim Likely to Claim? | |
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Is Medical Cost Inflation Different in No-Fault States? | |
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Summary of Key Factors Behind Cost Growth | |
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Conclusion, Policy Implications, and Future Developments | |
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Policy Lessons | |
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Is No-Fault a Failed Policy Experiment? | |
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How Could No-Fault Be Improved? | |
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Likely Future Developments and Their Possible Implications | |
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Pay-as-You-Drive Auto-Insurance Technology | |
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Autonomous-Vehicle Technology | |
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Universal Health Insurance | |
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Conclusion | |
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Appendix: Required Insurance and Actual Insurance | |
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Bibliography | |