Why Intelligence Fails Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War

ISBN-10: 0801447852
ISBN-13: 9780801447853
Edition: 2010
Authors: Robert Jervis
List price: $42.50 Buy it from $3.64
30 day, 100% satisfaction guarantee

If an item you ordered from TextbookRush does not meet your expectations due to an error on our part, simply fill out a return request and then return it by mail within 30 days of ordering it for a full refund of item cost.

Learn more about our returns policy

Description: The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why  More...

Used Starting from $20.62
what's this?
Rush Rewards U
Members Receive:
coins
coins
You have reached 400 XP and carrot coins. That is the daily max!
You could win $10,000

Get an entry for every item you buy, rent, or sell.

Study Briefs

Limited time offer: Get the first one free! (?)

All the information you need in one place! Each Study Brief is a summary of one specific subject; facts, figures, and explanations to help you learn faster.

Add to cart
Study Briefs
History of Western Art Online content $4.95 $1.99
Add to cart
Study Briefs
History of World Philosophies Online content $4.95 $1.99
Add to cart
Study Briefs
American History Volume 1 Online content $4.95 $1.99
Add to cart
Study Briefs
History of Western Music Online content $4.95 $1.99

Customers also bought

Loading
Loading
Loading
Loading
Loading
Loading
Loading
Loading
Loading
Loading

Book details

List price: $42.50
Copyright year: 2010
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Publication date: 2/4/2010
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 248
Size: 6.00" wide x 9.00" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 1.276
Language: English

The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations-analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind-were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.

Acknowledgments
Adventures in Intelligence
Failing to See That the Shah Was in Danger: Introduction, Postmortem, and CIA Comments
Analysis of NFAC's Performance on Iran's Domestic Crisis, Mid-1977-7 November 1978
CIA Comments on the Report
The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure: What Everyone Knows Is Wrong
The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence and Intelligence Reform
Notes
Index

×
Free shipping on orders over $35*

*A minimum purchase of $35 is required. Shipping is provided via FedEx SmartPost® and FedEx Express Saver®. Average delivery time is 1 – 5 business days, but is not guaranteed in that timeframe. Also allow 1 - 2 days for processing. Free shipping is eligible only in the continental United States and excludes Hawaii, Alaska and Puerto Rico. FedEx service marks used by permission."Marketplace" orders are not eligible for free or discounted shipping.

Learn more about the TextbookRush Marketplace.

×